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ABSTRACT 
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) as a formal requirement began in the 
United States with the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
in 1969. Formal EIA procedures have since been adopted world-wide. However, 
until recently, little research had been undertaken with respect to "follow-up", i.e. 
evaluating the effectiveness of EIA in predicting the impacts or optimizing 
outcomes associated with human actions. In fact, it was not until the mid-1980s 
that questions regarding the utility and efficiency of EIA were given serious 
consideration. This has highlighted the need for formal EIA follow-up. The EIA 
audit process allows such follow-up through obtaining relevant information and 
examining and evaluating EIA procedures and the actual environmental 
consequences of a project or action. 
The use of and expenence with environmemal audits is still limited, though 
the situation is changing as interest in the subject has increased over the past 
decade. with audit investigations conducted in Canada, the United Kingdom, the 
United States and Australia and elsewhere. However. the scope of these audits 
generally has been limited to bio-physical issues. with socio-economic issues either 
significantly under-represented or completely omitted. 
ll 
The limited research in this area provides the underlying rationale for this 
thesis, which investigates socio-economic impact assessment (SEIA) auditing using 
Newfoundland's Hibernia oil development project as a specific case study. Based 
upon earlier audits, an SEIA auditing method is established and applied to this 
project. As in other audits, poor wording and inadequate monitoring data 
preclude an evaluation of the majority of Hibernia impact predictions. Of 193 
impact predictions identified only eight could be audited. Of these, three are 
consistent, and the remaining five inconsistent, with the original predictions for 
the project. 
These findings further confirm that, in general, neither the current format 
of Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) nor the quality of the monitoring data 
being collected is well-suited to the auditing approach typically used. This raises 
the question of whether the current approach to EIA is itself adequate or useful. 
In this thesis it is instead argued that an EIA approach emphasizing impact 
management rather than impact prediction, is better suited to the dynamic nature 
of both the development projects and the context in which they operate. Such an 
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Chapter I INTRODUCTION 
1. 1 Environmental Impact Assessment: A Background 
The early 1960s saw mounting public concern regarding the effects of human-
induced changes to the natural environment. Since this time, there has been 
increasing public awareness of the need to identify, evaluate and effectively 
manage the impacts of human developments on both the physical as well as the 
human environments. The environmental movement in the United States during 
the 1960s resulted in a heightened environmental awareness and consequently 
increased public pressure for government to develop and implement measures to 
ensure that the environmental ramifications of development projects be 
considered. The American governmental response to this public persistence was 
the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969. 
In response to similar public pressure in Canada, in 1973 the Canadian 
federal government developed a policy which created the Environmental 
Assessment and Review Process (EARP). From 1973 to 1987 this process was 
used to assess and manage the environmental effects of development projects 
falling within federal authority. Subsequently, from 1987 to 1991 efforts were 
made to reform Canada's assessment and review process which ultimately resulted 
in the passage of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) in 1992 
and which was proclaimed into law in 1994. 
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The CEAA and NEPA require that projects, within federal jurisdiction and 
deemed to have potentially significant environmental consequences, be subject to 
an environmental impact assessment (EIA), a process which attempts to identify, 
predict and assess the likely impacts of a project development. The proponent 
must prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS), a document which 
summarizes the results of the EIA, i.e. the anticipated impacts of the project, as 
well as proposed measures to mitigate any adverse impacts and\or enhance any 
beneficial outcomes. The EIS is reviewed by the regulatory body in order to 
assist in decision-making as to whether or not the proposed project should 
proceed. 
Since the establishment of the federal EARP, the concept of project EIA 
has been embraced at the provincial level within Canada. Presently, each 
province has formalized assessment and review procedures in place. In some 
cases, these procedures are contained in legislation. Newfoundland, for example, 
enacted a formal environmental assessment process under its Environmental 
Impact Assessment Act, passed in 1980. 
The notion of EIA has also diffused world-wide, with most developed 
countries having adopted formal EIA procedures. Since its inception, vast 
amounts of time and money have been expended on the implementing and 
conducting of EIA. However, until recently very little has been done by way of 
follow-up, that is, to determine whether EIA has been effective in the avoidance 
or minimization of adverse impacts and/or the maximization of benefits 
associated with human activities. In fact, it was not until the mid-1980s that 
questions regarding the utility and efficiency of EIA arose. Accompanying this 
was the recognition of the need for a formal feedback mechanism within the EIA 
process to identify and evaluate the actual environmental consequences of a 
project or action. The EIA audit is a process of obtaining relevant information 
and examining and evaluating EIA procedures and project or action outcomes. 
Although the notion of post-project audits has existed in the literature 
smce 1969, and while interest in the subject of environmental auditing has been 
increasing over the past decade, the use of and experience with environmental 
audits is still limited. Newfoundland is a case in point. Since the enactment of 
the province's environmental impact assessment legislation some fifteen years ago, 
there has been no formal audit performed to date for any project which has 
passed through the provincial EIA process. 
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The situation with respect to EIA auditing, however, has been changing m 
that over the last ten years the value and significance of follow-up has been 
realized world-wide, with a considerable increase in the level of thought and 
research being devoted to the subject. The provisions of the CEAA bear 
testimony to the increased emphasis given to follow-up. The Act requires the 
development of follow-up programs prior to the granting of project approval. A 
"follow-up program" under the Act is defined as one designed for the verification 
of the accuracy of the environmental assessment of a project; and the evaluation 
of the effectiveness of any mitigative measures developed to address the adverse 
environmental effects of the project (Canada,i992:4), and as such parallels the 
notion of "EIA audit". 
The regulations/ guidelines governmg the Act· s follow-up provisions have 
yet to be finalized and will have to address a number of issues pnor to the 
implementation of these audit/follow-up procedures. Such issues include the 
method of conducting an audit, the pre-requisites for auditing, the party or parties 
responsible for conducting as welt as paying for the audit, and the authority 
responsible for administering the overall auditing process. 
Those responsible for developing the CEAA regulations/guidelines can 
benefit from recent EIA audit research in that some of the above issues have 
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received consideration through investigations which have been undertaken in 
several countries including Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Australia. 
However, most of these studies, and much of the research which has been 
conducted with respect to developing a framework or methodology for auditing, 
have been limited in scope. Almost all have had a bio-physical bias, with socio-
economic issues having been either significantly under-represented or completely 
omitted from the study. The reasons for this are not clear. It may be that socio-
economic impacts are less tangible and not as easily quantified, thereby making 
them more difficult to audit. Or, as some researchers have suggested, the lack of 
socio-economic impact auditing research may testify to the fact that many EIA 
researchers view socio-economic issues as less significant than those of a bio-
physical nature. 
In any event, it can be argued that socio-economic issues, to date, have not 
received adequate attention in the research literature. It is both this lack of and 
need for EIA auditing research which emphasizes the socio-economic impacts of 
human actions that serve as the underlying rationale for this thesis. 
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1.2 Thesis Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the concept of environmental 
auditing, and, more specifically, socio-economic impact assessment (SEIA) 
auditing, employing the development of offshore oil and gas from the Hibernia 
project in Newfoundland as a specific case study. 
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This thesis has three objectives. The first is to determine a method of 
performing a SEIA audit based upon a review of audit investigations performed to 
date. The second objective is to apply this method to the Hibernia experience --
that is to compare the actual socio-economic consequences of the project, to date, 
to the predicted socio-economic impacts -- in order to identify the pre-requisites 
for. as well as the benefits and constraints of. SEIA J.uditing. Finally, a more 
general objective is to examine the role of environm-::1ral impact assessment 
auditing in the broader context of environmental planning, using the results from 
the Hibernia audit case study. 
1.3 The Hibernia Case Study 
The Hibernia project had its beginnings in 1979 with the discovery of oil in the 
Hibernia P-15 well off the southeast coast of Newfoundland. In 1980, the 
proponent, Mobil Oil Canada, Ltd., applied to develop the resources of the field. 
Because the proposed project fell within Canadian federal jurisdiction, it was 
subject to the former EARP. Accordingly, an EIA was conducted and the results 
summarized in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The Hibernia EIS 
contains predictions of the impacts likely to result from project activities. 
Volume IV of the Hibernia EIS, in particular, addresses the socio-
economic impacts of the project. A number of impact predictions are made with 
respect to issues such as housing, employment, demography, the fishery, and the 
impacts on Newfoundland's ''social fabric". The auditing procedure developed for 
this research is used to evaluate the accuracy of these predictions. 
1.-+ The Auditing Procedure 
The first step in the research was to identify predicted impacts of the project. 
The primary sources for this information are the report of the Hibernia 
Environmental Assessment Panel and the EIS. The Panel Report was reviewed 
first to determine those socio-economic issues raised during the public review of 
the EIS. This served to highlight issues of significant concern. This was followed 
by a review of the project EIS and the subsequent Environmental Protection Plan, 
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designed for the Gravity Base Structure (GBS) construction site, to identify the 
impact predictions made by the proponent. 
Once a list of impact predictions was compiled, an investigation of the 
actual socio-economic consequences of the project was conducted. This involved 
a review of monitoring data and other project reports. In addition, personnel 
from the provincial/federal government, Hibernia Management and Development 
Company (HMDC), Newfoundland Offshore Development Constructors 
(NODECO) and other industry representatives - those people responsible for 
impact management during the project - were contacted to supplement the 
monitoring data. The predicted impacts were then compared to actual project 
consequences. 
The results of this analysis are then used to drzm conclusions with regard 
to the Hibernia project, in particular, and EIA auditing procedures, in general. 
Some of the limitations of the contemporary approach to EIA also are discussed 
in light of the findings of the Hibernia audit. 
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1.5 Results of the Hibernia Audit 
The results of the research have relevance to both the Hibernia project and other 
subsequent offshore oil and gas projects in Newfoundland and elsewhere. At the 
time of writing some two years remain in the construction phase of Hibernia 
before field development and production begin. Information resulting from this 
specific audit of Hibernia's site preparation and early development stages may be 
applied to subsequent stages of the project. As well, while Hibernia is Canada's 
first major Atlantic offshore petroleum field to be developed, other potential 
offshore oil and gas reserves have been discovered on Canada's east coast. Thus, 
the experience gained and lessons learned from this project should be employed 
co benefit future projects. 
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This research also provides insight into EIA as well as the broader 
environmental planning process. The CEAA prescribes the need for EIA follow-
up programs. The definition within the Act suggests that "follow-up program" is 
synonymous with "EIA audit". The results of this research identify some of the 
requirements for and constraints to implementing such audit/follow-up programs. 
The findings from this audit of Hibernia impacts are similar to those of 
most audits undertaken to date; poor wording of the predictive statements and the 
paucity of adequate monitoring data preclude an evaluation of the majority of 
predictions. The audit of the Hibernia project reveals that, of the 193 socio-
economic impact predictions made, only eight are suitable for audit. Of these, 
outcomes from three are consistent with the original predictions while the 
remammg five either under- or over-estimate the impacts of the project. 
These findings further confirm that in general neither the format of the 
EISs being produced nor the quality of the monitoring data being collected is 
well-suited to the auditing approach employed to dare, with its emphasis on 
impact prediction accuracy. However, this raises rhe question of whether the 
current approach to EIA --a "demand" approach, which emphasizes predictive 
precision -- is itself adequate or useful. In this thesis it is instead argued that a 
"capacity" approach to EIA, with a greater emphasis on impact management 
rather than impact prediction, is more appropriare LO accommodate the dynamic 
nature of both rhe development projects and rhe context in which they operate. 
Such an approach would also serve to better imegrare EIA into the broader 
environmental planning process. 
10 
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1.6 Thesis Format 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter fi 
contains a discussion of the research literature relating to EIA auditing. The next 
chapter discusses the objectives of this research and also provides background 
information to the Hibernia project. Chapter IV contains a discussion of methods 
of EIA auditing, with particular attention given to the methods employed in two 
large-scale audits undertaken in Australia and the United States. This is followed 
by a description of the method used for the Hibernia socio-economic audit. The 
next chapter discusses the Hibernia auditing process and the results of that audit, 
while the implications of these findings, for Hibernia in particular and EIA in 
general, comprise the focus of Chapter VI. The final section of the thesis first 
summarizes the findings in order to draw conclusions regarding EIA auditing in 
general. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications for auditing, 
the current approach to EIA and the general environmental planning process. 
In short the thesis takes issue with current EIA audit philosophy and 
recommends an alternative more in keeping with the dynamics of real-world 
impact management than traditional, static, accounting approaches. 
Chapter II ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT AUDITING: 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2. 1 Environmental Impact Assessment: Its Beginning 
The contemporary environmental movement in the United States developed 
during the 1960s. This and the preceding decade were characterised by a thriving 
economy and rapid industrial development. However, during this time there 
developed a heightened public awareness and concern regarding the 
environmental costs and side-effects of these development activities and "a vague 
unease about problems that accompanied unbridled economic growth and 
prosperity" (Couch, 1989:5). As a consequence. public pressure mounted during 
the 1960s for government to develop and implement procedures which would 
ensure the consideration of the environmental ramifications of such development 
projects. The culmination of public persistence was rhe passage of the American 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969. Incorporation of 
environmental issues into development planning and decision-making now became 
a legislated requirement. NEPA required that any proposed development 
considered to have potentially adverse impacts be subject to an environmental 
impact assessment (EIA). 
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EIA is a process designed to address the environmental implications of 
human activities. It involves the identification, prediction and evaluation of the 
likely impacts of human actions in order to assist in decision-making. Various 
definitions of EIA have been offered. For example, Lee (1983:5) defines EIA as: 
a process by which an action, that requires the approval of a public 
authority and which may give rise to significant environmental side 
effects, is submitted to a systematic environmental evaluation, the 
results of which are then taken into account by the public authority 
in deciding whether or not to approve it. 
Munn (1985: 159) goes somewhat further, suggesting that EIA ts: 
an activity to identify, predict, interpret and communicate 
information about the impact of man's actions (legislative proposals, 
policies, programs, projects and operational procedures), on man's 
health and well-being (including the well-being of the ecosystems on 
which man's survival depends). 
Others further expand the definition to include a mitigative or management 
component to address the potential impacts which have been identified. For 
example. Beanlands and Duinker (1983: 18), describe EIA as: 
a process or set of activities designed to contribute pertinent 
environmental information to project or program decision-making. 
In doing so it attempts to predict or measure the environmental 
effects of specific human activities or do both, and to investigate or 
propose means of ameliorating those effects, 
while CEARC (1988: 1) defines EIA as a process: 
which attempts to identify and predict the impacts of legislative 
proposals, policies, programs, projects and operational procedures 
on the biogeophysical environment and on human health and well-
being. It also interprets and communicates information about those 
impacts and investigates and proposes means for their management. 
Since the passage of NEPA, the practice of EIA has been adopted in 
countries world-wide. For example, a similar environmental consciOusness arose 
in Canada during the 1960s and 1970s. Canadians also became concerned about 
the increasing pressures being placed upon the environment by industrial and 
technological advances and called for II more concrete measures II to avoid future 
problems (Harrison and Rothschild, 1983:509). The federal government 
responded to these concerns with the establishment of the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) in 1973. From 1987 to 
1991 steps were taken to reform Canada's assessment and review process which 
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ultimately resulted in the passage of the Canadian E:1\ ironmental Assessment Act 
(CEAA) in 1992. While the CEAA is now in effecc. regulations governing certain 
components of the Act have yet to be finalized. Because the Hibernia project 
pre-dates the CEAA, it was subject to the former EARP. For comparative 
purposes, a general background and the components of this process as well as 
those of the new Act are outlined below. 
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2.2 Canada's Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) 
Canada's EARP was established by a decision of Cabinet on December 20, 1973 
and the Process was later modified by a subsequent Cabinet decision on February 
15, 1977. Two years later, the Government Organization Act reconfirmed the 
federal environment minister's responsibility for the environmental management 
of federal activities. On June 22, 1984 the Environmental Assessment and Review 
Process Guidelines Order-in-Council (OIC) was proclaimed under the above Act. 
This OIC outlined and clarified the various roles, responsibilities and procedures 
of EARP (Couch, 1989: 13). 
The purpose of EARP was to ensure that all federal proposals are assessed 
early in the planning process in order to identify their potential effects on the 
natural and social environments. Couch (1988: 13) defines a federal proposal as 
one in which a federal department is the direct proponent; makes a financial 
commitment; or is located within an area of federal jurisdiction. 
The framework developed to help administer the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment and Review Process is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The process 
comprised three stages: i) self-assessment; ii) independent panel review; and iii) 
decision and implementation. 
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Figure 2.1: Framework of the Former Canadian Environmental Assessment and 
Review Process (EARP) 
STAGE 1: SeU-Assessment 
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SfAGE2: Independent Panel Review 
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The self-assessment phase began with the submission of the proposed 
project to the initiating department, the federal department possessing the 
decision-making authority for the particular proposal, who screened the proposal 
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to determine its potential impacts. If the potential impacts were deemed 
significantly adverse, the proposal was referred to the Minister of Environment for 
a formal public review. 
The referral of the proposal to the Minister marked the beginning of the 
second stage of EARP -- the independent panel review. The Minister appointed 
the environmental assessment panel and issued its terms of reference for the 
review. The mandate of the panel was to assist the proponent in preparing an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) document, distribute the EIS for public 
review and subsequently hold public hearings. Based upon its review, the panel 
submitted a report, containing its conclusions and recommendations, to the 
Minister of the initiating department and the Minister of Environment. 
The third and final stage of EARP began with the initiating Minister 
reviewing the assessment panel's report and issuing a decision with respect to the 
proposal. Either permission was granted to proceed with or without modifications 
or the proposal was abandoned or postponed. For those proposals given 
ministerial approval to proceed, the initiating Minister was responsible for 
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developing and administering appropriate follow-up procedures (Couch, 1989: 13-
14). 
2. 3 EIA as a Legislative Requirement: the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act (CEAA) 
The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) was passed in January 
1992 and proclaimed into law in 1994. The environmental assessment process 
pursuant to the CEAA is generalized in Figure 2.2. 
An environmental assessment under the CEAA is generally required for 
projects of which a federal department or agency is the proponent; contributes 
funding or land: or serves a regulatory role through the issuing of permits or 
licences. 
The CEAA outlines four types of assessmenr: screenmg; comprehensive 
studies: mediation; and panel review. These four types fall under the two broader 
categories of self-directed assessments and independent assessments. Screening 
activities and comprehensive studies make up the "self-directed" category in that 
the government authority responsible for the particular project is required to 
ensure that the provisions of the CEAA are complied with during assessment 
Figure 2.2: The Environmental Assessment Process Under the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act 
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procedures. Mediation and panel review are classed as "independent assessments" 
because mediators and panel members appointed by the Minister of Environment 
are independent of the government (CEAA, 1994: 12-13). 
2.3.1 Self-Directed Assessment 
If it is determined that the project is subject to the Act, the responsible authority 
decides whether to proceed with a screening or a comprehensive study. Screening 
-- defined as the systematic documentation of the environmental consequences of 
a proposed project as well as the significance of these consequences -- allows for 
the modification of the project plan and/or the development of strategies to 
either eliminate or mitigate any significantly adverse project-related environmental 
effects (CEAA, 1994: 15). 
Those projects needing comprehensive studies are outlined in the 
Comprehensive Study List Regulation, one of the four existing regulations of the 
CEAA. The scope of the comprehensive study includes that of the screening 
process and addresses other factors including the purpose of the project; viable 
alternatives to the project and their environmental implications; the existing 
capacity of renewable resources likely to be significantly impacted; public input; 
and the need for and requisites of any follow-up programs. 
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Upon completion of the screenmg process or a comprehensive study, a 
report summarizing their results must be completed under the authority of the 
responsible authority. Based upon the findings, a decision is made as to whether 
or not the project should proceed, should be cancelled, or warrants an 
independent assessment (CEAA, 1994: 15-19). 
2.3.2 Independent Assessments 
There are generally four conditions under which a project would be referred for 
independent assessment: 
if uncertainty exists with respect to the potential for significantly adverse 
environmental impacts resulting from the project; or 
the likelihood for significant adverse environmental impacts is high but 
whether such effects are justifiable under the circumstances is uncertain; or 
public concerns regarding potentially negative project outcomes are such 
that an intensive assessment is warranted; or 
if the potential exists for project outcomes to result in transboundary 
effects, i.e. across international, provincial or federal/non-federal 
jurisdictional boundaries (CEAA, 1994:21). 
Mediation is one type of independent assessment in which the Minister of 
Environment appoints an independent and impartial mediator to administer a 
process of negotiation between the stakeholders of the project. In the event that 
dispute resolution is not attained, the mediator will refer the project to the 
Minister for a panel review. 
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The panel revrew process under the CEAA is similar to that of the former 
EARP. The Minister, in consultation with the responsible authority, appoints the 
panel and establishes its terms of reference. The panel is responsible for 
directing the proponent in the preparation of the environmental impact statement 
(EIS), organizing public hearings and preparing a report summarizing its 
conclusions and recommendations. 
In both types of independent assessment, the mediator or the panel is 
required to produce an environmental assessment report describing its rationale, 
any conclusions and recommendations as well as any input received from the 
public. This report is submitted to the Minister and the responsible authority and 
serves as the basis for any further decisions regarding the project. If it is 
determined that the project's impacts are not likely to be significant, before the 
project can proceed, the appropriateness of follow-up programs must be 
determined by the responsible authority (CEAA, 1994:21-29). The design or 
approval, and implementation of such programs is the responsibility of the 
Minister of Environment, as indicated in section 53 of the Act: 
Where the Minister has referred a project to a mediator or a review 
panel ... ,the Minister shall, in accordance with any regulations made 
for that purpose, design or approve any follow-up program that the 
Minister considers appropriate for the project and arrange for the 
implementation of that program (Canada, 1992:37). 
2.4 EIA: A Lack of Follow-up 
Follow-up procedures are a formal requirement under the CEAA, and 
were also outlined under the former Canadian Environmental Assessment and 
Review Process. However, unlike the CEAA which appoints the Minister of 
Environment responsible for the design and implementation of follow-up 
programs, there was no specific body established under EARP to either oversee 
such activities or to ensure that they were performed. The Federal 
Environmental Assessment and Review Office was the agency responsible for 
administering the EARP. However, it was not within the mandate of the 
assessment and review office to conduct or coordinate follow-up procedures. 
Rather, as indicated in Stage 3 of Figure 2.1, it was the responsibility of the 
Initiating Minister to administer follow-up procedures for approved projects. 
Research has shown, however, that the implementation of follow-up was 
not widespread under the former EARP. For example, a 1987 review of federal 
projects having been subject to the process concluded that: 
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there is little evidence of consistent programs or procedures, 
scientific or administrative, for a comprehensive approach to follow-
up. In addition, ... follow-up is not done to the degree that it should 
be within the federal system (McCallum, 1987:733). 
Instead, expenence indicates that most emphasis has been placed on the 
initial stages of EIA, i.e. the pre-approval stage, while very little attention has 
been given to the post-approval and post-project components (Tomlinson and 
Atkinson, 1987a: 188). This is evidenced by the fact that while data are readily 
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available for pre-approval activities within the EARP, the same does not hold true 
for post-approval activities. For example, since the inception of the EARP in 
1973, 56 of the projects subjected to the process proceeded to the panel review 
stage. Environmental assessment panel reports had been submitted to the 
Minister of Environment for 39 of these projects, thus marking the completion of 
the panel review stage. All of these reviewed projects were granted ministerial 
approval to proceed. However, whether follow-up investigations were conducted 
for the 39 projects is not easily ascertained as no composite data bank pertaining 
to such activities had been developed (Barnes, pers.comm., 1992). 
The apparent lack of and uncoordinated approach to follow-up under 
EARP was related to the fact that there was no specific follow-up procedure 
outlined. In fact, there was no formal requirement to undertake monitoring 
one of the fundamentals for follow-up (see CEAA section 6. 7). The CEAA has 
addressed this shortcoming of the former EARP as it contains formal provisions 
for follow-up programs (see CEAA section 6.8). 
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The inadequacy of follow-up procedures within EIA is not limited to 
Canada. Research indicates that the monitoring of project impacts is not a formal 
requirement under the EIA procedures of many countries. For example, the 
results of a comparative review of EIA systems of several countries (Wood, 1995) 
indicate that of the seven systems analysed, four did not contain specific 
requirements for monitoring, while the remaining three contained partial 
requirements. In many cases, discretionary provisions exist, but in practice, these 
are rarely employed. The United States is a case in point. Under the National 
Environmental Policy Act, monitoring is essentially discretionary and to date 
follow-up efforts have been generally "weak". In fact. according to Wood (1995), 
monitoring is widely recognized as the "weak link" in the American EIA system. 
The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, on the other hand, fares well in 
the Wood (1995) comparison. The importance and value of EIA follow-up is 
acknowledged in the CEAA which formally defines 'follow-up program' and 
contains provisions for the development and implementation of such a program. 
The details of the follow-up program must be outlined and approved by the 
responsible government authority prior to project approval. 
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The lack of follow-up prevents the evaluation of EIA. For example, since 
its beginning, a considerable amount of time and money has been expended on 
the implementation of EIA. However, without effective follow-up procedures, it 
is not known whether this investment of resources has been worthwhile or 
whether the goals of the EIA process have been attained. Further, in the event 
that the project does not result in any significant adverse consequences, without 
such follow-up, determining whether this lack of any measurable negative impact 
is attributable to the assessment, proponent activities, the proposed mitigative 
measures, or just pure chance would be difficult, if not impossible (Rigby, 
1985:215). 
Because of this absence of follow-up and feedback, the effectiveness of 
EIA and its role in the planning process have come under question. 
There is, in fact, growing concern about the effectiveness and 
efficiency of EIAs at the technical and administrative levels and 
about the role of impact assessment in the broader process of 
planning ... It is important, therefore, to examine the accuracy and 
utility of environmental impact forecasts and to evaluate the 
scientific, technical and administrative aspects of the EIA process in 
the context of overall development policy (Munro et.al., 1986: 1). 
It has been suggested that an environmental audit could provide the factual 
information necessary for such follow-up as well as the feedback mechanism to 
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assist in the revision of future EIA procedures (Tomlinson and Atkinson, 1987a). 
Jakimchuk (1987) suggests that the environmental audit is "the missing link" which 
would help better integrate the assessment activities with the other components in 
the planning process. 
2.5 The Environmental Audit 
The term "audit", borrowed from accounting, conveys the idea of data certification 
and verification of practice. The notion of post-project audits, also referred to as 
post-project studies, evaluations or analyses. has existed in the literature smce 
1969 and, from the mid to late 1970s onward, interest in the subject of 
environmental auditing has been increasing (Rigby, 1985; Berkes, 1988). 
2.5.1 The Value of Environmental Auditing 
Perhaps the most commonly cited strength of environmental auditing is its 
feedback function. It is argued that information obtained from auditing should be 
incorporated into decision-making procedures of subsequent projects. According 
to Spaling et. al. ( 1993:70): 
Feedback would provide information on the effectiveness of 
institutional processes. and also on the accuracy and reliability of 
impact prediction ... Ex-post evaluations would provide hindsight 
information contrasting the intended and actual EIA process, and 
comparing the predicted and observed impacts. This information 
would serve as a learning opportunity to improve project design and 
impact prediction for other proposed actions at different locations in 
the future. 
Similarly, Buckley (1991:94) suggests that the principal advantage of 
systematic environmental auditing: 
is that it provides a feedback link in environmental planning and 
management. .. Environmental impact audit provides a measure of 
the accuracy of the initial prediction, and potentially, of the 
"environmental management effort" needed to bring actual impacts 
into line with expectations where initial estimates proved inaccurate. 
This also provides a "learning function" in EIA as a whole: future 
predictions can take into account the outcomes of past predictions. 
Wood ( 1995: 199) points out that in addition to assisting impact forecasting 
for future projects, the results of the audit also would serve a public relations 
function; they could demonstrate government and industry concern for the 
environment and also provide public reassurance of the effectiveness and success 
of their impact management strategies. 
28 
The absence of such knowledge of the successes and/or failures of the EIA 
process of past projects inhibits the advancement of such procedures. Without 
feedback, those techniques and procedures which prove to be effective and 
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successful remam unknown to others. As a result, time and resources may be 
wasted as EIA practitioners and researchers independently "keep reinventing the 
wheel" (Munro et. al., 1986:28). 
Conversely, a lack of feedback may result in the propagation of ineffective 
or unreliable EIA techniques and procedures. Often, practitioners adopt 
information and methods from assessments of similar projects or similar 
environments. However, such an approach may be inappropriate as the validity of 
many of these techniques is seldom evaluated. As a consequence, it is quite 
possible that predictive techniques are being employed and, subsequently, 
decisions made and actions implemented based upon models and information 
whose validity and accuracy are unknown (Tomlinson and Atkinson, 1987a: 188). 
Some authors suggest that the feedback and learning opportunities 
associated with auditing could also serve to enhance the general approach to EIA. 
According to Tomlinson and Atkinson (1987a: 188), a major weakness of EIA 
practice has been its use solely to obtain a development permit instead of as an 
environmental management tool. The focus has been primarily on the "front-end" 
or the pre-approval activities of EIA with little consideration being given to the 
outcomes of these approved projects (McCallum, 1987). 
30 
Sadler (1988: 129) describes this lack of emphasis given to the actuaL socio-
economic and environmental effects of the development project or to the 
effectiveness. of the mitigative and management measures which are adopted as 
"the paradox" of EIA since the absence of follow-up precludes any opportunity to 
learn from other project experience and, therefore, inhibits the advancement of 
EIA. As Bisset and Tomlinson ( 1988: 126) conclude: 
there is a need for a feedback mechanism in EIA which involves the 
transfer of knowledge from the actual environmental effects of a 
project or action to future EIA's ... This can only be achieved 
through audits. 
2.5 .2 An Evolving Definition 
While the idea of environmental auditing is some two and a half decades 
old. and a recurrent theme in the literature, the use of, and thus experience with, 
environmental audits is still limited. This may be attributed in the past to the fact 
that there was no standard definition for "environmental audit" (Rigby, 1985; 
Tomlinson, 1987; Bisset and Tomlinson, 1988; Buckley, 1991). Since first 
introduced, the concept has evolved and expanded. As a result, the term has 
come to be used to define and describe a much wider range of procedures and 
activities. This is illustrated by the various definitions of environmental audit 
which follow. 
Munro et.al. (1986:2) distinguish between "environmental audit" and 
"comprehensive environmental audit". The focus here, however, is primarily on 
the variance between predicted and actual consequences: 
an environmental audit would do little more than catalogue and 
verify the effects of a project, or, to put it another way, collate the 
results of monitoring ... A comprehensive environmental audit ... 
would relate the actual effects of a project to the predicted effects 
of the project and whatever mitigation measures were undertaken. 
On the basis of scientific evidence, it would define and analyze the 
causes of variance between the actual and the expected. 
Tomlinson and Atkinson (1987a) apply the concept of auditing to other 
aspects of EIA. They propose seven different types of auditing and their roles 
within the EIA process. These are outlined below: 
i) Review or Draft EIS Audit. This involves a review of the draft EIS 
vis-a-vis its terms of reference. 
ii) Decision Point Audit. This type of audit examines the effectiveness 
of the EIS within the decision-making process. 
iii) Implementation Audit. Its purpose is to determine whether the 
recommendations of the EIS or the Review Panel were 
implemented. 
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iv) Peiformance Audit. This is an examination of the company's internal 
environmental management of a project and its ability to respond to 
environmental incidents during project operations. 
v) Project Impact Audit. Such an audit involves the examination of the 
environmental consequences of a project. Its purpose is to 
determin~ whether these consequences were originally forecast. 
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vi) Predictive Technique Audit. This involves a comparison between the 
actual and predicted effects of a project in order to verify and 
improve predictive techniques. 
vii) EIA Procedures Audit. EIA procedures provide the framework 
within which EIAs for particular projects are carried out. An audit 
of these procedures would examine the performance of EIA 
procedures at the macro level and could include any or all of the 
above forms of audit. 
Buckley (1991: 121) further expands the definition and applies it not_ only to 
the EIA process but to the other aspects of the environmental management 
process, including: compliance, monitoring programmes, impact predictions, 
equipment performance, physical hazards, financial risks, products and markets, 
baselines and benchmarks, management programmes and structures, planning 
procedures and legislation. 
Thus. over the past decade the label "environmental audit" has been 
adopted to represent a broader range of activities than was the case when it was 
first conceived. Initially, it was used to refer only to a follow-up of EIA 
predictions. However, "environmental audit" now refers to such things as testing a 
company's pollution controls and monitoring equipment to ensure that it meets 
operational specifications; assessing the "greenness" or the environmental 
friendliness of a company's retail products; or, with regard to corporation mergers 
and acquisitions, i·dentifying any environmental liabilities associated with the 
takeover target that may be transferred to the new corporation ~Buckley, 1991). 
As a result, EIA auditing, which was once synonymous with environmental 
auditing, is now only one of many types of procedures which fall under the 
umbrella of "environmental auditing". 
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The fact that the scope of the definition has broadened is indicative of the 
increased thought and research which has been devoted to environmental 
auditing. Some of this heightened attention has been directed toward the area of 
EIA auditing. As a result, EIA audit studies have been undertaken in such 
countries as Canada, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
2. 5. 3 EIA Audit Case Studies 
The majority of EIA audits that have been cJmed out thus far would fall 
under either Project Impact Audits or Impact Prediction Audits, as defined by 
Tom! ins on and Atkinson (1987a). Some of these audit studies addressed single 
projects, such as the post-project evaluation of the CP Rail Rogers Pass 
Development (Ross and Tench, 1987), while others involved a multi-project focus, 
e.g. Buckley's (1991) national study of Australian impact predictions and 
Culhane's (1987a; 1987b) follow-up of American EISs. 
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To date, the most common form of EIA auditing being undertaken is the 
Predictive Techniques or Impact Prediction Audit. Such studies are concerned 
with assessing the accuracy of pre-project predictions and forecasts relative to 
actual project outcomes. A general recurring conclusion of such investigations has 
been that project impacts are rarely accurately forecast. 
... there is an increasing amount of effort being directed towards 
evaluating the utility of EIA. This effort has led to a recognition 
that the predictive capabilities of the subject are, as yet, poorly 
developed and that accuracy of such predictions leaves much to be 
desired (Tomlinson and Atkinson, 1987b:259). 
[n most instances, the predictions have either fallen short of the observed impacts 
or have over-estimated the potential outcomes of a project or undertaking 
(Canter, 1985:264). Such conclusions are illustrated by the case studies which 
follow. 
One of the initial efforts to conduct a comprehensive impact prediction 
audit was undertaken by the Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department of 
the Interior in 1975 (see Bisset, 1980). The bureau carded out an audit of a 
politically controversial off-road motorcycle race which spanned approximately 155 
miles of desert terrain from Barstow, California to Las Vegas, Nevada. 
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The results of this study revealed that many of the predictions in the EIS 
could not be tested due to insufficient and inappropriate monitoring data. Those 
predictions for which adequate monitoring data were available generally were 
determined inconsistent with initial forecasts (Bisset, 1980:384). For example, one 
of the key findings was that the extent of the ground surface area impacted by the 
race course was some 31 percent larger than was forecast in the EIS. 
An audit of twelve U.S. power plant construction projects conducted by the 
Denver Research Institute also discovered a mismatch between actual and 
predicted impacts. For example, some of the findings indicated that the timing 
and magnitude of construction employment differed substantially from pre-project 
estimates. Construction workforce size estimates were usually wrong as they were 
often understated. In several instances, the actual number of workers exceeded 
the original forecasts by more than 200 percent ( G d more et. al., 1980: 418). 
Results also indicated that the geographical extent of the impact area for 
these construction projects was greater than expected due to an under-estimation 
of the extent of commuting to the construction site. It turned out that the 
commuting range was larger than anticipated. This resulted in an over-estimation 
of socio-economic impacts in the local area as the workforce was more dispersed 
(Gilmore et.al., 1980:419). 
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An audit was also undertaken with respect to the socio-economic impacts 
of the Coal Creek power station in North Dakota (Leistritz and Maki, 1981). It 
was concluded that the impacts on fiscal characteristics, population and public 
services of local communities were "generally consistent with the predicted 
impacts" (Bisset and Tomlinson, 1988: 123). However, the same did not hold true 
for the projections of construction worker housing requirements. These estimates 
exceeded the required number as many in-migrant workers preferred various 
forms of temporary accommodations to the mobile homes provided (Bisset and 
Tomlinson, 1988: 123). 
Murdock et.al (1982) reviewed a sample of American socio-economic 
impact statements to evaluate their accuracy. Due to a paucity of socio-economic 
information in many of the EISs, the final review was more limited than was 
initially intended in terms of both the number of EISs reviewed and the number 
of socio-economic variables audited. Thus, the final investigation involved a 
review of 44 EISs in order to assess the accuracy of 1980 population projections 
contained within these documents. The EISs contained projections for some 104 
counties and 45 cities. These forecasts were compared with the population data 
in the 1980 U.S. Census. 
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The results revealed a wide discrepancy between actual and projected 1980 
populations. Of the 104 county projections reviewed, 57 (or 55%) were in error 
by more than 10% and 14 (or 13%) were in error by more than 25%. As well, 
projections were equally likely to over-estimate as to under-estimate the actual 
population, as 48% of the forecasts were under-estimates while 52% exceeded the 
Census data. 
The difference between the actual and predicted populations was even 
greater for the cities. Thirty-five of the 45 city projections reviewed (or 75%) 
were in error by more than 10%, 19 (or 42%) by more than 25% and 6 
projections were incorrect by an error margin of more than 100%. As well, city 
projections tended to be over-estimates with onlv 9 (or 20%) of the forecasts 
falling below the actual number. The researchers concluded that the results of 
the accuracy assessment were "not encouraging" (t-.lurdock et.ai., 1982:339-346). 
The inability of EISs to accurately forecast project impacts is further 
supported by the audit conducted to evaluate the accuracy of fish and wildlife 
predictions contained within the planning reportS for 20 U.S Army Corps of 
Engineers reservoir projects. The unit "man-day use" was used to quantify the 
projections for angling and hunting use at these reservoirs and their surrounding 
areas (Tomlinson and Atkinson, 1987b:.246-249). 
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Of the 20 projects reviewed, 16 contained sufficient data to evaluate 
angling projections and 18 projects provided adequate information to test the 
predicted hunting activity. With respect to angling, 11 of the 16 projects under-
estimated man-day use with an average error of 63% while the remaining 5 over-
estimated angling activity by an average of 179%. Total hunting was higher than 
predicted at 14 of the 18 projects (Tomlinson and Atkinson, 1987b:249). 
Results of audit studies conducted in the United Kingdom have also . 
revealed the limited predictive capability of environmental impact statements. 
Perhaps the most renowned U.K. audit study is that undertaken by the former 
Project Appraisal for Development Control (PADC), now the Centre for 
Environmental Management and Planning (CEMP), at the University of 
Aberdeen (see PADC, 1983). 
The primary objective of this research was to determine the accuracy of 
impact predictions through the comparison of predicted and actual impacts of 
selected development projects and in doing so identify the optimum predictive 
techniques. The four projects included in the study were the Flotta and Sullum 
Voe oil terminals, the Redcar Steelworks and the Cow Green reservoir (Clark 
et.al, 1987). 
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A total of 94 predictions were audited of which 27 pertained to Sullum 
Voe, 17 to Flotta, 21 to Redcar and 29 to Cow Green. Firm conclusions were 
reached for 77 (or 82%) of these predictions. The results indicated that 44 (or 
47%) were deemed accurate while 33 (or 35%) proved inaccurate. When 
analyzed on an individual basis it was found that 18 (or 67 %) of the Sullum Voe 
predictions were accurate, 7 (or 41 %) of Flotta's forecasts were judged correct, 5 
(or 24%) were accurate in the Redcar case and 14 (or 48%) of the Cow Green 
reservoir outcomes were considered consistent with the projections (Clark et.aL, 
1987:530). 
In another study, the Transport and Road Research Laboratory of the 
United Kingdom undertook research to evaluate the accuracy of predictions made 
in urban transport studies over a 20 year period (see Mac kinder and Evans, 1981). 
Forty-four transport studies were selected for review from a series of urban 
studies. conurbation studies and land use transportation studies. Twelve forecast 
variables, including number of households, number of cars per head and numbers 
employed, were employed to measure the general forecasting process. It was 
concluded that the predictions generally over-estimated the level of change in the 
variables. For example, the projected number of households exceeded the actual 
number by 5%, car ownership was over-estimated by 27% and the numbers 
employed over-extended by 11% (Tomlinson and Atkinson, 1987b:257). 
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In addition to those case studies reviewed thus far, two audit studies have 
been carried out which were much more extensive in terms of the number of EISs 
included and the total number of forecasts audited. The first is that performed by 
Culhane (1987a; 1987b) with respect to the accuracy of EISs produced in the 
United States. This investigation included 29 EISs which contained a total of 
1,105 forecasts. However, the number of forecasts for which auditing procedures 
were undertaken was considerably less in that a field sample of 239 forecast 
impacts was selected for the final analyses. 
Unlike the CEMP audit in the U.K., firm conclusions regarding predictive 
accuracy were not formulated in this case in that the researchers concluded that, 
while the majority of the forecasts in the sample were not deemed accurate, few 
of them were "clearly inaccurate". For example, only 15 were considered blatantly 
wrong and were classified as "inconsistent". Another fifth of the forecasts were 
judged to be inaccurate, "but unclearly so" . 
. . this evaluation found EIS forecasts to be not inaccurate. This 
double negative is used to highlight the conclusion that very few 
impacts in the sample are demonstrably inconsistent with EIS 
forecasts ... On the other hand, only about a third of the forecasts m 
the study are tolerably accurate. The more numerous, middling 
forecasts are either pseudo-accurate solely by virtue of their 
forecasts vagueness or somewhat inaccurate in various complicated 
ways (Culhane, 1987a:375). 
41 
Buckley's (1991) evaluation of the environmental impact predictions of 
Australian EISs is an example of another extensive, large-scale audit. Unlike the 
approach employed by Culhane (1987a; 1987b), this study included only those 
predictions that were quantifiable and scientifically testable. As a result, the 
results are presented in a more precise and quantitative fashion. 
Of the 181 predictions included in the investigation, 131 (or 72%) were 
found to be as or less severe than predicted while the remaining 50 (or 28%) 
proved more severe. The researcher reduced the total number of predictions to 
68 by selecting only the most aggregated or the most critical of the fully quantified 
forecasts in each of the 9 major impact categories. Of these, 40 (or 59%) were as 
or less severe than expected and 28 (or 41%) were more severe. The overall 
mean accuracy of these 68 predictions was -1.4%. ± 5 S: ( 1 SE) while, individually, 
the predictions differed by more than three orders or magnitude, with the actual 
impacts ranging from 0.05x to 37x the predicted value (Buckley, 1991: 115). 
In summary, the above case studies illustrate the limited success with 
respect to accurately predicting the environmemal effects of development projects. 
The majority of predictions made within the EISs of the projects reviewed either 
under- or over-estimate project impacts. 
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2. 5 .4 Procedural 0 ifficul ties in Conducting the EIA Audit 
In addition to illustrating the inability of current techniques to accurately forecast 
the likely outcomes of development projects, the above studies also illustrate that 
impact prediction auditing is not as straightforward a task as it might seem, re-
affirming the conclusions of Bisset (1980:389): 
Although the implementation of audits appears, superficially, to be a 
conceptually simple exercise, experience shows it is fraught with 
difficulties. 
Three general procedural difficulties were common to several of the audit 
case studies. The first is that many of the predictions outlined in the 
environmental impact statements and other project documentation were 
unsuitable for audit. For example, Buckley (1991:96) discovered that many of 
these documents contained few testable predictions but rather simply outlined 
issues of concern. As well, those predictions which were testable generally 
addressed minor impacts while major impacts were discussed qualitatively. 
Others have criticized the non-quantitative style as we11 as the nebulous 
wording of many of the EIS forecasts. For example, Culhane (1987a:374) 
describes forecasts as being "confoundingly vague" regarding impacts' significance 
and probability of occurrence, as lacking quantification and as being ambiguous 
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with respect to the direction or beneficiality of impacts. Clark et.al. (1987:530) 
reported that in all the case studies they reviewed, many predictions were 
expressed in "vague, imprecise and woolly language". Similarly, McCallum 
(1987:737) found many predictions too vague to evaluate, while Canter (1985:264) 
made reference to the "non-specificity" of EIS predictions. As well, Munro 
et.al. (1986: 12) concluded that most environmental predictions are imprecise and 
qualitative, and contain phraseology that was "tentative and uncertain". 
A second general problem encountered during auditing procedures is a 
temporal one. First, few forecasts contain any reference as to when the impacts 
are likely to occur (Clark et.al., 1987:532). Such a time frame is essential to 
ensure that appropriate monitoring measures are in place in order to identify 
project-related variations in a particular environmemal component. Otherwise, 
project impacts would go undetected which could ulumately result in erroneous 
conclusions regarding either the environmental consequences of the project or the 
effectiveness of management systems established for the project. 
Another time-related factor which complicates the auditing process is the 
time interval between formulation of EIS forecasts and the occurrence of the 
actual impacts. The specific details of developmem projects are almost always 
changed --often substantially --between the conceptual or design stage as 
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employed for the EIA, and actual project operations (Buckley, 1991:96). As a 
result, project descriptions outlined in the EIS are frequently incomplete or 
tentative and the impact forecasts, which are based on these descriptions, no 
longer relevant and thus untestable (McCallum, 1987:737; Clark et.al., 1987:530). 
Researchers at the University of Aberdeen conclude that the project design 
factors exogenous to the project often change so much between assessment and 
audit that comparisons become very difficult (Munro et.al., 1987: 15). 
The third obstacle identified in the case studies involved monitoring data. 
The success of. and indeed, the ability to perform an audit, is contingent upon the 
availability and quality of pre-project and post-project operations monitoring data. 
In most studies. the monitoring data necessary to evaluate the reliability of impact 
predictions were either non-existent, insufficient or inadequate (Buckley, 1991: 96; 
CEARC, 1988:2-3; Sonntag, 1987:451; Munro et.al., 1986:13; Canter, 1985:258; 
Murdock et.al., 1982:337; and Bisset, 1980:390). 
Monitoring programs and data were seen to be deficient in several 
respects. Sometimes monitoring programs were not related to the forecasts 
outlined in the EIS and those programs that were related did not always generate 
data appropriate for audit. For example, predictions may have been made for a 
particular location or time period but the monitoring data were collected at a 
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different location or expressed for a different period. As well, monitoring data 
often did not permit statistically valid testing of the predictions as the data either 
had too few samples, inadequate controls or too many missing data points 
(Buckley, 1991:96; and Clark et.al. 1987:533). 
It was also found that baseline or pre-project information was often lacking 
(CEARC, 1988:2; and Canter, 1985:264). It is argued that in many cases such 
data do not cover a sufficient time period to allow the identification of natural or 
"without project" patterns in the environmental factors being considered. It is 
generally accepted that baseline data should span a period greater than one year 
to permit the identification of seasonal variations and natural longer-term 
fluctuations. However, achieving this is often not possible as time limitations 
prevent obtaining the requisite pre-operational data rBisset, 1980:389). As a 
result. such insufficient data make it difficult to eswbi ish a cause and effect 
relationship between project activities and the resultant impacts (Clark et.al. 
1987:533). 
The availability and accessibility of monitoring data can be another 
obstacle in the auditing process. Data may be difficult to obtain either because 
they have not been published or because circulation of the information has been 
restricted (Buckley, 1991: 118; and CEARC. 1988:3). 
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Both the nature of the impact predictions and the availability of adequate 
monitoring data have significantly limited the number of auditable predictions. In 
most case studies, a large proportion of predictions were deemed untestable due 
to the above limitations and thus excluded from the investigations. For example, 
Bisset ( 1980) reported that many of the predictions identified in the Bureau of 
Land Management study could not be tested due to poor monitoring data. 
Similarly, Buckley (1991) determined that of the thousands of forecasts contained 
in the 800-1000 EISs and equivalent documents produced in Australia between 
197 4 and 1982, monitoring data to test these predictions exists for only three 
percent of these EISs. In the study by Henderson (1987), of the 122 predictions 
identified for audit, 42 lacked sufficient monitoring data while 10 were either too 
vague or obsolete due to project modifications (Buckley, 1991:95). Murdock et.al. 
( 1982) found that of the 225 EISs reviewed, only 44 were suitable for evaluation. 
As well, in the CEMP study, 791 predictions were extracted from the EISs and 
project documents of which 697 were untestable and 94 were audited (Clark et.al., 
1987). 
The case studies demonstrate the complexities involved in performing an 
EIA audit. As indicated, precise forecasts and reliable monitoring data, the 
essential components for effective and constructive auditing have not been the 
norm. The concluding remarks of the authors of the CEMP study illustrate the 
general experience with EIA auditing: 
The main conclusion of the research, in terms of testing predictions, 
is that it has been very difficult to audit the impacts predicted for 
developments. Impact predictions are not phrased in a way which 
allows auditing, and they become obsolete very easily. In addition, 
existing monitoring programs are not very useful in providing data 
to allow predictions to be tested in a scientifically acceptable 
manner (Clark et.al., 1987:537). 
2.6 Socio-Economic Impact Audits 
The above conclusions have been derived primarily from the auditing of bio-
physical impact predictions. Indeed, such forecasts have been the focus of most 
audit studies while those pertaining to socio-econom:c issues are largely under-
represented in much of the EIA audit research performed to date. 
Few audits have focused specifically on socio-economic impact forecasts 
with the main exceptions being those studies conducted by Murdock et. al. (1982) 
and Gilmore et.al. (1980). Typically. socio-economic impact predictions either 
comprise only a small proportion of those being audited, as was the case in the 
follow-up study of Australian EIS predictions (Buckley, 1991) in which only nine 
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of the 181 reviewed were socially related, or socio-economic issues are altogether 
excluded from the study, as in the CEMP study of the four development projects 
in the United Kingdom (Clark et.al., 1987). 
One reason for the limited number of socio-economic impacts being 
audited may be related to the fact that forecasts involving socio-economic issues 
are severely lacking in many EISs. For example, in the study performed by 
Murdock et. al. ( 1982), more than 27 percent of the EISs reviewed were rejected 
from the analysis due to a lack of socio-economic projections and only one fifth of 
the 225 EISs investigated contained sufficient information for audit. These results 
led the researchers to conclude either that the U.S environmental review process 
is seriously flawed or that socio-economic issues are viewed as insignificant. 
As most audits have addressed bio-physical impact predictions, much of the 
research which has been conducted with respect to developing a framework or 
methodology for auditing has had a bio-physical bias (see Rigby, 1987; Sadler, 
1987; Davies and Sadler, 1990; and Buckley, 1991;). Whether the approaches 
adopted for bio-physical auditing research are appropriate for socio-economic 
impact projections is not known as there has been little research undertaken with 
respect to this. Davies and Sadler (1990) suggest that, because of the different 
nature of social impact assessment, it may be necessary to reassess existing 
auditing procedures in order to accommodate socio-economic impacts. 
The practice of social [i.e. socio-economic] impact assessment 
incorporates a number of assumptions and approaches which differ 
from those of EIA as it is conventionally defined. Therefore, it is 
useful to consider how the present guidelines must be reorganized 
to accommodate social practices. Although social impact monitoring 
has been the focus of recent research, little development has been 
achieved in the direction of monitoring and auditing social impacts 
and assessment methodology (Davies and Sadler, 1990:30). 
This need for research in the area of socio-economic impact auditing thus 
serves as the basis for undertaking this particular research. 
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Chapter III THE HIBERNIA PROJECT CASE STUDY 
3. l Research Objectives 
There are three objectives of the research. The first is to determine a method of 
conducting a socio-economic impact assessment (SEIA) audit. To achieve this, 
previous audit case studies, including studies emphasizing both socio-economic 
and bio-physical issues, were reviewed in order to identify the methods employed 
in these investigations to determine whether a standard EIA auditing procedure 
existed or if not, to devise such a method. 
The second objective is to then operationalize the auditing method usmg 
the Hibernia offshore oil project as a specific case study. The scope of the audit 
was to compare the actual socio-economic consequences of the site preparation 
and early development phases of the Hibernia project, to date, with the predicted 
socio-economic impacts. The results from the audit could then be used to identify 
the benefits of, the constraints to and the pre-requisites for SEIA auditing. 
The final objective is to examine the role of EIA auditing in the 
contemporary EIA process as well as the broader environmental planning process, 
on the basis of the results of the Hibernia audit. 
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3.2 The Hibernia Project 
3.2.1 The Hibernia Oilfield 
In May, 1979, Chevron Canada spudded the Chevron et. al. Hibernia P-15 
discovery well under an exploration agreement, known as a farm-out agreement, 
with Mobil Oil Canada, Ltd. (C-NOPB, 1986:3). The Hibernia oil field is located 
315 kilometres east-south-east of St. John's, Newfoundland. It is situated along 
the continental shelf, at the north-eastern point of the Grand Banks, in water with 
an average depth of 80 metres (see Map 3. 1). The field covers an area of 
approximately 130 square kilometres and latest estimates place the Hibernia 
recoverable reserves at 666 million barrels of oil and 1,017 billion cubic feet of 
gas (C-NOPB. 1994: 16). 
3. 2. 2 Environmental Assessment and Approval for Hibernia 
In 1980. Mobil Oil Canada. Ltd .. the lead company of a group of five with interest 
in the field, applied on behalf of the group for permission to develop the field. 
Because of the nature of the proposed development project, Mobil's application 
Map 3.1 Location of the Hibernia Oil Field and the 
Bull Arm Platform Construction Site 
0~--====--~300 km 
(Source: Storey .1995: 312) 
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MUNCLi!:ll 
was subject to Canada's former federal Environmental Assessment and Review 
Process (EARP) (see section 2.2). 
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The initiating department, Energy, Mines and Resources Canada (EMR), 
conducted an initial screening of Mobil's proposal and concluded that the 
magnitude of such a development project had the potential to adversely impact 
the surrounding environments. · As a result, EMR referred the proposed Hibernia 
development project for a Panel Review (Hill et. aL., 1992:70). 
As a consequence of EMR's referral, Mobil was required to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the proposed project and to develop 
strategies to eliminate or mitigate any negative impacts and to optimize the 
benefits of the project. Accordingly, Mobil conducted the EIA between 1980 and 
1985 and in May of 1985 submitted an environmemal impact statement (EIS) 
which summarized the results of the EIA and outlined the proposed mitigative 
measures. 
The Hibernia Environmental Assessment Panel (Panel) was formed to 
review the EIS. The Panel was established under the provisions of the Atlantic 
Accord -- an agreement signed between the Canadian and Newfoundland 
governments on February 15, 1985. Its mandate was to review the proposed 
project and to make recommendations with respect to the terms and conditions 
under which the project could proceed m a manner that was safe and 
environmentally acceptable. (HEAP, 1985:9). 
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During the course of its review, the Panel held hearings and accepted 
written submissions to ensure public input into the review process. In October 
1985, public hearings were held which involved 29 meetings in ten different 
Newfoundland communities during which time interested parties were given the 
opportunity to comment on the EIS. The Panel heard 66 oral presentations and 
received some 90 written submissions during these meetings. In December 1985, 
the Panel submitted its report (HEAP, 1985) to the Canada-Newfoundland 
Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NOPB) recommending that the Hibernia project be 
permitted to proceed. 
The C-NOPB was established under the Atlantic Accord as the body 
responsible for the administration of regulations regarding the development of 
hydrocarbon resources offshore Newfoundland. Prior to rendering its decision 
with respect to the Hibernia project, the C-NOPB reviewed and assessed Mobil's 
Hibernia Benefits Plan and Hibernia Development Plan (C-NOPB, 1986:4). 
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The Benefits Plan document outlines Mobil's objectives and strategies to 
optimize Hibernia-related benefits to Canada and Newfoundland. The 
Development Plan contains a detailed description of the various components of 
the Hibernia project including a description of project facilities; scheduling for 
construction and development drilling; and production forecasts (C-NOPB, 
1986:4). Based upon its assessment of the Benefits and Development Plans and 
consideration of the Panel recommendations, the C-NOPB, in its Decision 86.01, 
granted conditional approval for the Hibernia project to proceed. 
In its Decision, the Board outlined some 22 conditions to be met by the 
proponent. Five of these pertain to the Benefits Plan and are primarily concerned 
with the maximization of Canadian participation in project activities and, more 
specifically, employment and training for Newfoundland residents. The remaining 
17 conditions, relating to the Development Plan. ensure that the design features 
of the production platform and its associated facilities are in accordance with 
environmental and human safety standards (C-NOPB, 1986:90-92). 
3.2.3 Hibernia's Fixed Production System 
In the EIS, the proponent assessed the impacts of two main development 
alternatives for the Hibernia project: one involved the use of a floating production 
system while the other considered a fixed production system. In August 1985, 
Mobil submitted an EIS Update indicating its decision to select the fixed 
production system as the preferred mode of development. This system was 
subsequently approved by the Board in its 1986 Decision (C-NOPB, 1986:4). 
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The principal components of the fixed production system are the Gravity 
Base Structure (GBS) and Topsides, which comprise the production platform; the 
Offshore Loading System (OLS); and the crude oil tankers (see Figure 3.1). The 
GBS will be constructed of 450,000 tonnes of concrete and 70,000 tonnes of 
reinforcing steel. It will be 111.2 metres in height and have a diameter of 106.6 
metres. The GBS will serve as a multi-compartment storage structure, with a 
storage capacity of 1. 3 million barrels of oil, as well as a support for the 
production facilities with four shafts extending above the caisson to which the 
Topsides will be mounted (HMDC, 1992: 1). 
The Topsides will contain all drilling, crude oil processing and service and 
utility equipment for the platform, as well as the worker accommodations. The 
Topsides will consist of five super modules, weighing between 5,000 and 8,000 
tonnes each, and seven topside mounted structures, each weighing between 250 
and 1.300 tonnes (See Figure 3.2). The completed production platform, when 
Figure 3.1: Components of the Hibernia Fixed Production System 
GBS Production 
Platform ~~~~~~ Catenary Riser 












Figure 3.2: Components of the Topsides Facilities for the Hibernia Production 
Platform 
(Source: PASS B. 1992:2. 9) 
M10- Process Module 
M20 - Wellhead Module 
M30 - Mud Module 
M31 - Drillers Offices/Piperack 
M40 - Utility Module 
MSO - Service/Quarters Module 
M51 - Helideck 
M52 - Air Control Module 
M60 - East Drilling Derrick 
M70 - West Drilling Derrick 
MSO - Main Lifeboat Station 
M90- Aux. lifeboat Station 
M91 -Flare Boom 
installed and ballasted, will stand 221.3 metres tall and weigh more than 1.2 
million tonnes (HMDC, 1992: 1-2). 
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It was indicated in the EIS that the GBS would be constructed at Adam's 
Head in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. In January, 1986, the construction of the 
GBS within this area was granted a site-specific exemption by the provincial 
cabinet from Newfoundland's environmental assessment procedures, subject to the 
completion and implementation of an Environmental Protection Plan (EPP) (Hill 
et.al., 1992:70). Such a plan is a site planning document which outlines the 
procedures to be employed by the contractors and sub-contractors so as to reduce 
or eliminate any negative impacts and to enhance those which are beneficial 
(Shrimpton and Storey, 1992:102). 
In March, 1986, the province established the Hibernia Construction Sites 
Environmental Management Committee (HCSEMC) with a mandate that 
included the formulation of guidelines and criteria for the EPP as well as the 
overseeing of the preparation of the proponent· s EPP for the GBS construction 
site (see section 3.2.5.3)(Hill et.al., 1992:70; Shrimpton and Storey, 1992: 102). 
Some four years spanned the time between the Board's approval of the 
project and the initiation of development activities at the GBS construction site. 
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This delay was due primarily to problems experienced in finalizing the financial 
arrangements of the project between the governments and the proponent. During 
this four year period, project designs were reassessed and in September 1989 
Mobil announced that it intended to change the site of the GBS construction from 
Adam's Head, Placentia Bay to Great Mosquito Cove in Bull Arm, Trinity Bay 
(see Map 3.2). 
Mobil stated that the new site offered a number of advantages over 
Adam's Head including: a sheltered location for the GBS drydock; a near-shore 
deep water site permitting the mating of the GBS and Topsides closer to shore; 
less under-water excavation required; less marine transport and fishing activity in 
the Bull Arm area; the close proximity of the GBS construction and Topsides 
assembly sites; and a shorter route to tow the production platform to the oilfield 
(HMDC, 1991:5). 
As a result of the GBS site change, the impacts on the area surrounding 
the new site had to be re-assessed. Thus, pursuant to the federal EARP, in 1990 
Mobil submitted an Initial Environmental Evaluation (lEE) (see Figure 
2.1)(MOCP, 1990). In June of the same year, the IEE was reviewed by the 
former Canada Oil Gas and Lands Administration who concluded that, because 
the construction of the GBS in Great Mosquito Cove would not present impacts 
61 
Map 3.2 Location of the Hibernia GBS Construction Site at 
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any more significant than those identified for the initial GBS site, another full 
federal Panel review was not necessary. A similar conclusion was reached by the 
Newfoundland government and the new site was exempted from the provincial 
environmental assessment procedures, again, subject to the development of EPPs 
and their approval by the provincial environment minister (Hill et.al., 1992:70). 
The development phase of the Hibernia project formally commenced on 
September 14, 1990 with the signing of the Project Cost-Sharing Agreement by the 
proponent and the federal and provincial governments. Construction of the Bull 
Arm site then began in October 1990. Since this time, activities at the site have 
been ongoing with respect to the construction of the GBS along with the 
fabrication of one of the five super modules (M-20 Wellhead Module) and four of 
the seven topside-mounted structures of the Topsides (M-81, M-82, M-83 and M-
84). 
3.2.4 Project Schedule 
According to the latest project schedule, the lower portion of the GBS, which was 
towed from the drydock to the deepwater site in November, 1994, will be 
completed by the end of 1996. During the spring and summer of 1995, the 
various Topsides components were delivered to the site, with assembly expected 
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to be completed by the end of the following year. The actual mating of the GBS 
and Topsides will take place sometime in the first quarter of 1997, followed by 
tow-out to the oilfield by mid-year and first oil production is scheduled for 
December 1997 (HMDC, 1993:2). 
[ t should be noted that these dates for the above "milestones" in the 
development phase are later than those initially forecast at the commencement of 
development activities in 1990. On two occasions the project schedule required 
revision as a result of unforeseen events. For example, in February, 1992 Gulf 
Canada Resources Limited, one of the main project partners, pulled out of the 
Hibernia project. This resulted in an almost complete cessation of activities as 
the future of the project became unclear. As well, design problems with respect 
to the GBS were experienced in 1993 which again delayed the project by over a 
year. Thus, although the proponent maintains that the project is on schedule to 
meet the 1997 first oil production date, previous experience should not rule out 
the pass ibility that further unanticipated events might occur to further delay the 
production of first oil. 
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3.2.5 Main Participants in the Development and Environmental Management of 
the Hibernia Project 
The mam players involved in the project are the proponent and its contractors, 
government and the public. A brief summary of the participants and their 
respective roles in Hibernia follows. 
3.2.5.1 Hibernia Management and Development Company (HMDC) 
The proponent of the Hibernia project is now a consortium of five partners: 
Mobil Oil Canada, Ltd. (33.125%); Chevron Canada Resources (26.867%); Petro-
Canada (25%); the Canadian government (8.5%); and Murphy Oil (6.5%). To 
oversee engineering and construction of the production system, field drilling and 
production operations, the partners formed a management company -- Hibernia 
Management and Development Company (HMDC) (Newfoundland, n.d. :5). 
The structure of HMDC is such that seven semor managers are responsible 
for the overall management of the company. These managers report to the 
company president who, in turn, reports to the Hibernia executive committee. 
This committee comprises senior representatives from the partner companies (see 
Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3: Structure of the Hibernia Management and Development Company 
Hibernia Development Project 
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(Source: HMDC, 1991:4) 
3.2.5.2 Major Project Contractors 
Since the Hibernia Agreement was signed in September 1990, HMDC has 
awarded contracts for the development and construction of the production 
platform. 
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The first major contract involved the preparation of the GBS construction 
site in Bull Arm and for the actual construction of the GBS itself. This contract 
was awarded to Newfoundland Offshore Development Constructors (NODECO). 
This is a joint venture consisting of Atlas Construction INC. of Montreal, Quebec; 
Concrete Products of St. John's, Newfoundland; Doris Engineering of Paris, 
France; Janin General Contractors Ltd. of Montreal, Quebec; and McNamara 
Construction Company/George Wimpey Canada Lrd. of St. John's, Newfoundland 
and Toronto, Ontario (Newfoundland, n.d. :6). 
Since the initial awarding of the GBS contract, project design has changed 
to include the process of slip-forming. Because Norwegian companies are 
experienced in this technology, HMDC has drawn on their expertise. As a result, 
NODECO is no longer the main contractor responsible for the GBS construction. 
Instead, the GBS Management Team (GMT) --of which NODECO is a member 
-- has since been formed to oversee the GBS construction project. Other 
members of this rrew joint-venture contractor consists of Norwegian Contractors, 
Peter Kewitt and Sorrs (PKS) and HMDC, with Norwegian Contractors having 
assumed the lead role in engineering activities. 
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Newfoundland Offshore Contractors (NOC) was awarded the Topsides 
Engineering Procurement/Project Services Contract. As a result, NOC is 
responsible for detail design of the Topsides and procurement/purchasing of all 
equipment for the Topsides structure (NODECO, 1991 (vol.l):6-4). NOC is also 
a joint venture whose participants include Aker Engineering of Oslo, Norway; 
BFL Consultants Ltd. of St. John's, Newfoundland; Brown and Root International 
Inc. of Toronto, Ontario; Moneco of Calgary, Alberta; and SNC Group of 
Montreal, Quebec (HMDC, 1991:3). 
The contract for the design, procurement and installation of the Topsides 
fabrication and assembly facilities at the Topsides site in Mosquito Cove, along 
with the actual fabrication and assembly of the Topsides Modules and topside-
mounted components, was awarded to the consortium of PCL of Canada; Aker 
Stord of Norway; Steen Contractors Limited of Toronto, Ontario; and Becker 
Contractors Limited of St. John's, Newfoundland (PASSB) (Newfoundland, n.d.:6; 
PASSB, 1992:2.1-2.3). PASSB is responsible for the fabrication of the M-20 
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Wellhead Module; M-81 Main Lifeboat Station; M-82 Auxiliary Lifeboat Station; 
M-83 Flare Boom; and M-84 Helideck (see Figure 3.2)(PASSB, 1992:2.10). 
Contracts for the remaining Modules and topside-mounted structures were 
also awarded. RDS of St. John's, Newfoundland won the contract for the three 
drilling Modules (M-71, M-72, M-73). The fabrication and construction contract 
for the M-10 and M-50 Modules was won by Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. 
of South Korea while Belleli s.p.a. of Italy received the M-30 and M-40 
construction contract (Newfoundland, n.d.:6) (see Figure 3.2). 
3.2.5.3 Government Management Structures 
The Atlantic Accord ( 1985) was an agreement of the joint federal-provincial 
management of the hydro-carbon resources offshore Newfoundland. Pursuant to 
the Atlantic Accord Implementation Acts (1987), the C-NOPB was established as 
the responsible authority for petroleum management as well as the administration 
of legislation and regulations governing the exploration and production of oil and 
gas resources in the Newfoundland area (C-NOPB, 1991). 
As a result, any petroleum development projects in this area require the 
approval of the C-NOPB. A proponent of offshore operations must submit a 
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development application for the Board's rev1ew. This application is to contain 
three principle documents: a Development Plan, a Canada-Newfoundland Benefits 
Plan and a Development Application Summary. Approval of the Benefits Plan is 
a pre-condition to approval of the Development Plan (C-NOPB, 1988: 1; C-NOPB, 
1990:7). 
While the C-NOPB is responsible for the offshore operations of the 
Hibernia project, the management of onshore activities is the responsibility of the 
Newfoundland government. A provincial government management structure has 
been developed to oversee Hibernia's onshore operations which are related 
primarily to the GBS construction project (see Figure 3.4). · 
A provincial government committee, the Hibernia Project Monitoring 
Committee (HPMC), was established to monitor Hibernia activities. The HPMC 
consists of Deputy Ministers and is responsible for such things as project-related 
economic benefits, legal agreements, environmental impacts, education and 
training, and safety. This committee reports to cabinet (Hill et.al., 1992:72). 
The Hibernia Construction Sites Environmental Management Committee 
(HCSEMC) was formed to oversee onshore activities at the GBS construction 
site. HCSEMC's mandate includes the formulating of EPP guidelines, ensuring 
Figure 3.4: Newfoundland Government Management Structure for Overseeing 
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public consultation and evaluating the effectiveness of the EPPs. HCSEMC 
reports to the HPMC. Various federal and provincial departments and agencies 
are represented on HCSEMC including Environment and Lands; C-NOPB; 
Education; Historic Resources; Development; Mines and Energy; Environment 
Canada; Fisheries; Fisheries and Oceans; Health; Employment and Labour 
Relations; Municipal and Provincial Affairs; Social Services; Canadian Coast 
Guard; Women's Policy Office; and COG LA (Hill et.al., 1992:72). 
HCSEMC is a coordinating body. Any monitoring studies and 
investigations are intended to be the responsibility of the individual departments 
represented on the Committee. To assist in the process, the Hibernia 
Construction Sites Environmental Management Committee Technical Working 
Group (TWG) was established. The TWG is responsible for review and 
evaluation of EPPs; the development and implementation of socio-economic 
moniroring and public consultation programs; and the overseeing of the 
implementation of bio-physical effects and compliance monitoring programs. 
TWG members are directors and senior managers of various federal and 
provincial departments (Hill et.al., 1992:72). 
The TWG is comprised of two sub-committees: one addresses bio-physical 
tssues while the other is responsible for those of a socio-economic nature. 
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Recommendations pertaining to the implementation of the EPP and monitoring 
activities are channelled from the subcommittees through the TWG to HCSEMC 
(Hill et.a£.,1992:72). 
3.2.5 .4 The Public Component 
From the outset, numerous interest groups and organizations have been formed to 
address the various issues that have arisen as the Hibernia project has evolved. 
These community groups have played an active role in some of the project 
decisions made to date. For example, since Bull Arm, Trinity Bay was announced 
as the site of the GBS construction project, a number of the region's community-
based organizations have been involved in local and regional planning for the 
project. These included such groups as: 
the Rural Oil Impact Monitoring Agency 
the Trinity-Placentia, Isthmus Area and Southwest Arm Regional 
Development Associations 
the Concrete Platform Community Advisory Committee 
the Come By Chance Area Regional Fishermen's Committee 
the Come By Chance Area Business Association, and 
the Hibernia Impact Municipalities Association. 
While, individually, each group has its own specific concerns and mandate, all 
have a common goal: 
While each community organization has its own mandate, 
geographic area of interest and concerns about the project, all 
groups share a common desire to maximize the social and economic 
benefits of GBS construction activity while minimizing any adverse 
social and environmental consequences of this project (Canning, 
1990: 1 ). 
Since these groups share the same general mandate, it was decided that 
their collective interests would be better addressed by a single community 
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organization rather than by each group acting independently. As a result, the Bull 
Arm Area Coordinating Committee (BAACC) was formed, circa October, 1990 
(Canning, 1990). This group is comprised of representatives from fourteen 
organizations - local community groups, fishermen's committees, development 
associations as well as other interested parties - and serves as a liaison between 
local interest groups and the proponent, "a 'single window' access to HMDC, 
NODECO and HCSEMC" (NODECO, 1991:2.5). The committee is funded by 
the provincial and federal governments and office space and equipment is 
provided by HMDC (Hill et.al., 1992:74). 
It is these indus try, government and community organizations which have 
responsibility for and/or interest in the management of the outcomes of the 
Hibernia project. It is the industry and government groups which are primarily 
responsible for monitoring and auditing project activities and impacts. 
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Chapter IV METHODS 
4. 1 EIA Auditing Procedures 
From a review of other audits completed to date, it is apparent that no one 
standard EIA auditing approach was employed. In the eight cases examined 
(section 2.3.3), the method outlined at the outset of each investigation required 
modification in response to a deficiency in the availability and suitability of 
monitoring data and/or the vague and imprecise nature of the wording of the 
impact predictions. Thus, each individual method was subsequently tailor-
designed to accommodate the specifics of the particular study. Customized 
methods notwithstanding, there were some procedures common to several of the 
audit investigations. 
4. l. 1 Definition and Identification of Impact Predictions 
One of the initial steps in any impact prediction audit involves compiling a list of 
those predictions to be included in the study. The primary sources for this 
information in those studies reviewed were the formal EIS and other documents 
produced for the environmental assessment in question (Gilmore et. at., 1980; 
Murdock et.a£.,1982; Rigby, 1985; Clark et.a£.,1987; and Buckley, 1991). During 
the course of each investigation, these documents were content-analyzed to 
identify those predictions made for the particular project. 
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Prior to the content-analysis of the vanous project documents, a clear 
understanding of what constituted a prediction, as well as an impact, was 
necessary. Within the literature, reference is made to forecasts, predictions and 
projections contained within EIS documents. The three terms are somewhat 
related in so far as they all refer to a future time period. However, while a clear 
distinction is often not made between a forecast and a prediction -- frequently the 
two are used interchangeably -- the term projection conveys a meaning distinctive 
from that of the others. 
According to their dictionary meanmgs, forecast and prediction are 
generally defined as being synonymous: 
forecast: 
prediction: 
a prophecy or prediction 
something predicted, a forecast, prophecy ,etc. (Hanks, 
1980:567, 1154). 
Within the context of EIA audits, these terms are also used synonymously by 
many of the authors. For example, the aim of the audit of American EISs, was to 
determine the accuracy of EIS forecasts. In this case, forecast is defined "as any 
passage in the final EIS about future consequences of a proposed action " 
(Culhane, 1987b:219). 
The definition of prediction offered by Clark et. al. ( 1987), in their United 
Kingdom case study, and Davies and Sadler (1990) conveys a meaning similar to 
that of Culhane's forecast definition: 
a probabilistic statement concerning a change or changes in 
environmental parameter or parameters arising from a project 
action (Also, "no change") Clark et.al., 1987:527). 
a statement concerning anticipated changes in a particular 
environmental parameter or parameters arising from a specific 
action or course of action and can also inc! ude statements of no 
anticipated change (Davies and Sadler, 1990:6). 
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In these definitions of forecast and prediction. reference is made to changes 
or consequences resulting from a specific development activity. 
Duinker (1987:404) also acknowledges the shared meanmg of prediction 
and forecast but describes the latter as being a special type of the former. 
However, his definitions do not emphasize changes which are directly attributable 
to a specific cause. 
A prediction is defined as a statement specifying the present or 
future condition of a particular aspect of a system without 
measuring it, given certain characteristics of the system. A forecast 
is a special kind of prediction where we specify the future condition 
of a particular aspect of a system. 
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EISs also contain projections which, like forecasts and predictions, refer to 
future conditions. However, unlike these other terms, a projection involves an 
extrapolation or approximate calculation, based upon known or existing data, of 
conditions or trends beyond the range of the those data. Projections are usually 
derived from models with associated parameters and assumptions. 
The EIS usually outlines two general types of projections, baseline 
projections and project-related projections. The former refer to the future status 
of a system (i.e. natural or human) or a component of that system. These are 
"without-project" projections. A project-related projection 1s one which outlines 
the future status of that same system or system component given the introduction 
of the particular development project into the system. These are "with-project" 
projections. 
If, when comparing the "without-project" and the "with-project" projections, 
there is a difference between the two, this difference represents the amount of 
change which would result from the project. And this difference is termed the 
proJect impact (see Figure 4.1). Thus, the comparison of "with-project" and 
"without-project" projections serves as the basis for impact predictions or impact 
forecasts. 
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One of the prrmary objectives of existing environmental impact assessment 
procedures is to predict or forecast such impacts with sufficient accuracy in order 
to allow effective decision-making and management with respect to development 
prOJeCtS. 
4. 1.2 Screening for Auditable Predictions 
Once a definition of prediction or forecast has been established, the relevant 
documents reviewed and a list of predictions or forecasts compiled, the next 
general step in the auditing process involves a screening of those predictions or 
forecasts to determine those which are auditable and can be included in the 
investigation. 
Criteria necessary to classify a prediction as auditable are outlined in EIA 
auditing literature. One such requirement involves the wording or the form of the 
presentation of the prediction. According to Clark et.al. (1987:528) and 
Tomlinson and Atkinson (1987b:260), the ideal prediction would be written as a 
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hypothesis and would be clearly defined in terms of the probability of occurrence, 
the geographical extent of the impact, a time scale within which the impact is 
likely to occur as well as the intensity or magnitude of the impact. 
Culhane ( 1987a) also discusses the ideal prediction, as described within the 
environmental impact assessment literature, and includes many of the above 
characteristics but goes on to emphasize the importance of quantification within 
the prediction. 
Quantification is the essence of the ideal prediction ... the ideal EIS 
prediction is (1) quantified using (2) a technically appropriate unit 
of measurement, and clearly identifies (3) the affected populations 
or resources that are measured and ( 4) the time at which the effect 
is to occur; it should also (5) explicitly state the significance of the 
impact and (6) be qualified by an estimate of the probability of 
occurrence of the impact (Culhane, 1987a:362). 
However, as most of the audit studies illustrate, the typical EIS prediction 
falls far short of this ideal, a recurrent finding is that many predictions are not 
quantitative and often are too vague or imprecise to audit (see section 2. 3. 4). 
Unfortunately, impact predictions are not expressed as hypotheses. 
Furthermore, many impacts are not readily quantifiable and are only 
described in qualitative terms (Clark et.al., 1987:528). 
In addition to excluding non-quantitative predictions and those containing 
nebulous phraseology, other predictions -- "implied" and "conditional" predictions -
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- are typically omitted from other audit investigations. EIS documents often 
contain statements which describe or outline the environmental impacts of similar 
projects developed at locations comparable to that of the particular project in 
question. However, if these statements do not explicitly predict that the proposed 
project will yield similar consequences, they are classified as "implied" predictions 
and are not included for audit (Davies and Sadler, 1990:22;Clark et.al.,1987:527). 
In other cases, some predictions were found to be contingent upon 
assumptions concerning environmental conditions. If these requisite conditions 
did not result, the predicted outcome could not occur. Thus, even though such 
"conditional" predictions may be auditable on the grounds of adequate 
quantification and clear wording, the absence of the necessary conditions render 
them unauditable (Davies and Sadler, 1990:22; Clark et.al., 1987:532). 
A third, and perhaps the most important, prediction screenmg criterion 
employed in the auditing investigations relates to the existence of relevant 
baseline and post-project monitoring information (Sonntag, 1987; Culhane, 1987; 
Clark et.al., 1987; and Buckley, 1991). Indeed, the success of the audit and the 
quality of its results are very much contingent upon the quality of the monitoring 
data. Both pre-project and post-project monitoring results are essential in order 
to establish a cause and effect relationship between the development project and 
the resulting impacts. In order to achieve this, the monitoring data must be 
compatible with the predictions outlined within the EIS in terms of unit of 
measurement, time frame and location. Results of impact audits performed to 
date indicate that inadequate monitoring data have significantly limited the 
number of predictions suited for audit (see section 2.3.4). 
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In addition to screening predictions for suitable wording and appropriate 
monitoring information, some studies evaluated the relevance of the prediction. 
Quite often there was a significant time interval between the date of EIS 
prediction formulation and the actual commencement of project activities and, 
thus, the occurrence of any associated project impacts. In many cases 
modifications were made to the initial project design and, as a result, some of the 
predictions were no longer relevant and therefore excluded from the audit 
investigation (Clark et.al., 1987:530; McCallum, 1987:737; and Buckley, 1991 :97). 
The final result of this screening process is a list of relevant impact 
predictions regarding future project-related changes the wording of which clearly 
describes such changes and for which monitoring data are available to evaluate 
the accuracy of these predictions. 
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4.1.3 Project Impact Data Collection 
Once a list of auditable predictions has been compiled, information about real 
project consequences must then be gathered and analyzed. The primary 
information sources concerning project impacts for many of the case studies were 
the documents, records and reports of the monitoring programs established by 
government and the proponent (Bisset, 1980; Murdock et.ai., 1982; Rigby, 1985; 
Clark et.al.,1987;Culhane, 1987;and Buckley, 1991). Davies and Sadler 
(1990:23-25) outline other sources of relevant documentation including conceptual 
and feasibility studies; development plans; project technical specifications 
screening reports; results of scoping procedures; environmental impact assessment 
reports; operating and compliance records; and management plans and 
procedures. 
In addition to this documented information, interviews or questionnaires 
may be employed either to supplement data obtained from the documentation or 
to evaluate those issues of a qualitative nature (Davies and Sadler, 1990:25). For 
example, in the United Kingdom audit (Clark et.al., 1987) local experts were 
questioned with respect either to the monitoring data or to their own 
interpretation of project-related events. Similarly, in the review of the Eastern 
Arctic South Davies Strait Drilling Project (Rigby, 1985), representatives from 
government and industry as well as community and public interest groups were 
interviewed to obtain information concerning the performance of the project. 
4.1.4 Comparison and Analysis of Predicted and Actual Impacts 
In light of the information obtained from the monitoring activities, project 
documentation, interviews and questionnaires, each of the auditable predictions 
can then be evaluated with respect to its accuracy. 
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Again, the approach employed in analysing and evaluating the predictions 
varied among the case studies according to the nature of the particular 
investigation. For example, in his national audit of Australian EISs, Buckley 
(1991) included only those predictions which were quantifiably testable. Culhane 
( 1987), on the other hand, attempted to accommodate both quantifiable 
predictions and also those of a more qualitative nature. As a result, the approach 
taken and the conclusions reached in the two studies are quite different. 
The remainder of this section discusses in some detail the approach 
employed by Buckley (1991) and Culhane (1987) in analysing and evaluating the 
predictions, in their respective studies. It should be noted that this discussion is 
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limited to these two studies because in none of the other case studies is there a 
description of the method of analysis/evaluation used. 
Buckley (1991) identifies two approaches for assessing the accuracy of 
predictions. The first emphasizes the logical correctness of the prediction, i.e. 
whether the conditions outlined within the prediction have been verified or 
refuted by the monitoring data. While such an approach will yield a proportion of 
accurate and inaccurate predictions, one might question the usefulness and 
validity of such results in that the level of precision of the prediction itself will 
largely dictate whether it is correct or incorrect. The higher the degree of 
prectston, the greater the probability that the prediction will' prove inaccurate or 
incorrect. 
Hence, the mere fact that a high proportion of predictions in an EIS 
have proved correct in a logical sense does not in itself demonstrate 
good environmental planning and management. It may simply show 
that the predictions were vague or unlikely to be falsified (Buckley, 
1991: 113). 
Another drawback of this approach is that such a simplified binary 
labelling of predictions gives no indication of the degree of correctness or whether 
the prediction overstated or understated the actual project impact. 
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The second approach described by Buckley (1991) does provide 
information with respect to the direction of difference between the predicted and 
actual project outcomes. Such an approach focuses on the relative severity of the 
actual consequences as compared with those predicted. A distinction is made 
between predictions which are as or less severe than expected and those which 
prove more severe. 
Buckley (1991) describes the results of the second approach as being more 
meaningful and useful than those of the first approach with respect to evaluating 
prediction accuracy. In order to demonstrate this point, both the logical 
correctness and the relative severity approaches were used in the Australian audit. 
Upon companng the predicted and actual impacts, each prediction was 
rated either correct or incorrect, depending upon whether or not the conditions of 
the prediction were substantiated. For those identified as incorrect, the direction 
of incorrectness was indicated through the use of such labels as better versus worse 
or more versus less. If the actual impact value exceeded that predicted, a label of 
worse or more was assigned, while a classification of better or less was used when 
the actual outcome fell below that predicted. In addition to this description of 
direction of inaccuracy, a measure of the extent of error was also calculated and 
expressed as a percentage generated from the predicted and actual impact values. 
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As an example, two predictions were made with respect to the wastewater 
discharge associated with a uranium mine. It was forecast that in years two and 
ten of operation the discharge would be 940,000 cubic metres and 1 ,230,000cubic 
metres, respective! y. However, the monitoring data indicated that in year two the 
discharge was 2,156 000 cubic metres and in year ten 577,000 cubic metres. As a 
result, in describing their accuracy, the following ratings were assigned: 
prediction 1: Incorrect: 44%, worse 
prediction 2: Incorrect: 47%, better (Buckley, 1991:103) 
Each prediction within the study received a similar classification. 
The results of the audit illustrate both the limitations of the logical 
correctness approach and the relative strengths of the proposed alternative 
approach. For example, of the 181 predictions audited, approximately 58% 
proved logically incorrect while roughly 42% were logically correct. While it may 
be argued that such results give some indication of our ability, or inability, to 
precisely predict project impacts, they are of no value with respect to addressing a 
more fundamental concern, that being the significance of the actual consequences 
of the project in question. For example, if in the previous example of wastewater 
discharge the predicted value was 940,000 cubic metres and the actual was 950,000 
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cubic metres, this prediction would be classified as logically incorrect. However, 
from an ecological perspective, this additional discharge may pose little threat. 
Furthermore, the fact that a prediction is incorrect does not always mean that the 
outcome is negative as may be connoted by the term, as when an anticipated 
adverse impact does not materialize or when the outcome is more beneficial than 
expected. For example, if it is predicted that a particular development project 
would result in a 20 percent increase in the crime rate in an area and such an 
increase does not result, while the prediction is incorrect, the outcome is positive. 
Similarly, if the unemployment rate in an area is predicted to drop by eight 
percent as a result of project-related employment opportunities and the actual 
drop is fifteen percent, although in cons is tent with that expected, the actual 
outcome is beneficial. 
The above limitations of the logical correctness approach to evaluating the 
accuracy of socio-economic impact predictions are related to the fact that audit 
studies have had a bio-physical emphasis. Generally speaking, the bio-physical 
impacts of a development project are of a negative nature whereby "more" impact 
typically means "worse". As indicated in the above examples, this does not apply 
to social and economic impacts where, in some cases, "more" or "less" impact can 
translate into "better" or "worse" depending on the particular socio-economic 
variable. 
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The second approach employed to evaluate the predictions avoids the 
above drawbacks. In addition to permitting the calculation of the number of 
accurate and inaccurate predictions, the results from this approach provide 
information concerning the nature of the impacts such as their magnitude and 
direction relative to the outcomes predicted. For example, upon analysing the 
findings, in terms of the relative severity of the actual impacts, 72% proved as or 
less severe while 28% were more severe than expected (Buckley, 1991: 14). Such 
information would seem of a greater value from an environmental management 
perspective than a simple count of correct and incorrect predictions. 
While the evaluation emphasizing the relative severity of project impacts rs 
the better of the two alternatives proposed by Buckley (1991), this is not to 
suggest that this approach is without flaws. One drawback is the labels employed 
in classifying the predictions. The labels of better versus worse or more versus less 
are used in different instances. The problem is that the former pair are value-
laden while the latter are of a more neutral nature. As a result, these pairs of 
labels are not comparable. For example, an actual impact value that is "more" 
than that predicted may be perceived as a "better" outcome in some instances and 
as a "worse" one in others. This, then, may pose difficulties when assessing the 
relative severity of the project consequences. 
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To use an example from the Australian audit, three predictions involved 
the project workforce. In two of these cases, the actual number of workers 
required exceeded the predictions while the other fell below the predicted value. 
The way in which these were categorized is unknown as the labels assigned to 
these particular predictions were not revealed in the study report. Are they more 
or less severe and from whose perspective -- the proponent or the community? 
This, then, raises the question of evaluating the predictions solely on the 
basis of severity as such an approach is designed only to address potentially 
adverse impacts; it cannot accommodate predicted beneficial project 
consequences, again reflecting the audit's bias toward bio-physical issues. If, for 
example, a development project was predicted to increase sales for local business 
by 20% and the actual increase was 35%, the severity scale of the above scheme 
is inappropriate to evaluate this particular impact which would generally be 
considered as favourable. 
Another drawback of Buckley's (1991) method is the manner in which the 
level of accuracy is presented. This measure of accuracy is expressed as a 
percentage which is calculated using the actual and predicted values. However, 
the author does not use a standard method of calculation in that in some cases 
the actual impact value is the divisor and the predicted value the dividend while 
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in other cases the opposite is true. As a result, a specific percentage would carry 
a double interpretation. In order to clarify, these statistics were accompanied by 
the labels better, worse, more and less to indicate whether the actual impact was 
greater or lesser than anticipated. For example, an accuracy rating of 65%: better 
or 65% :less is translated to mean that the actual outcome was less than, and 65% 
of, the expected, while the ratings 65% :worse and 65% :more both mean that the 
predicted value was less than, and 65% of, the actual project impact. 
While the above method may be legitimate and may achieve the objective 
of depicting the amount and direction of predictive error, it is complicated. These 
same objectives could be achieved in a less complex way. For example, expressing 
the relative accuracy of the impacts as a ratio of the actual to the predicted 
impact value in decimal form would eliminate the need for labels. Each impact 
would receive a numerical score and the closer the number to one, indicating an 
exact match between predicted and actual outcomes, the greater the accuracy of 
the prediction. Scores greater or less than one would indicate that the prediction 
either overstated or understated respectively the actual project consequences. As 
a result, the accuracies of the individual predictions would be more easily 
compared. Once again, however, the issue of significance is ignored. 
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Notwithstanding the drawbacks identified, the objectives of Buckley's 
(1991) evaluation scheme are of value. A basic, simplistic binary classification of 
correct versus incorrect predictions is of little value in that it provides nothing by 
way of constructive feedback with respect to impact prediction and assessment. 
An evaluation which incorporates a degree of accuracy and the direction of 
inaccuracy would seem much more useful in terms of gauging predictive 
capability. 
The audit of American EISs undertaken by Culhane (1987), unlike the 
Australian audit, was not limited in scope to only those predictions that were 
quantifiably testable. The method of evaluation adopted in this investigation 
employed a rating scheme consisting of 39 codes and involved three comparisons 
of the actual impacts with those forecast. These comparisons emphasized: 
the match between the forecast and actual impact; 
the direction of the actual impact relative to that predicted; and 
the relative beneficiality of the actual impact. 
Once again, the predictions could not be simply classified as right or 
wrong, there were numerous "grey"predictions. As a result, in summarizing the 
accuracy of the predictions, some seventeen categories were created ranging from 
"close",signifying the most accurate, to "inconsistent", representing the least 
accurate, with a series of, in my view, complicated classifications in between. 
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In Culhane's (1987) schema, the accuracy of the predictions may be 
described according to two broad categories - those which were consistent with 
the project consequences and those which were inconsistent. Within each of these 
categories were forecasts of varying degrees of accuracy (see Figure 4.2). With 
respect to consistent forecasts, those that were exactly correct or were very 
proximate to the actual impacts were classified as being "close". Others were also 
clearly accurate but were inherently apparent outcomes of the particular project. 
These were described as being "intuitively obvious". As well, predictions which 
forecast no impact and for which no impact was discernible were categorized as 
being consistent with project outcomes. Other predictions were predisposed to 
being accurate either because they contained a considerable range or were 
imprecisely worded. Such impacts were labelled as falling "within range of vague 
forecast". Finally, some predictions, while not straightforwardly obvious, were 
interpreted as being "arguably accurate" with respect to actual outcomes (Culhane, 
1987a:372). 
Similarly, a series of sub-classifications were designed for those impacts 
which did not match the conditions predicted. Forecasts which were clearly wrong 
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Figure 4.2: Culhane's (1987a) Forecast Accuracy Classification Scheme 
Consistent (Accurate) Forecasts 
- close 
- complex, arguably accurate 
- within range of forecast 
- no clear impact, none forecast 
- accuracy was intuitively obvious 
Inconsistent (Inaccurate) Forecasts 
- inconsistent 
- complex, deemed essentially inaccurate 
- impact exceeds forecast 
- impact less than forecast 
- some impact forecast, no clear impact 
- unanticipated 
- underanticipated . 
Others 
- impact disputed, spurious 
- impact has not yet occurred 
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were classified as "inconsistent". Such forecasts usually were found to be in the 
wrong direction. If. however, the forecasts correctly identified the direction of 
impact but either overstated or understated the magnitude of the actual project 
outcomes, these forecasts were not seen as "inconsistent" but instead were 
separately categorized as "impact exceeds forecast" and "impact less than forecast". 
Another subgroup of inconsistent forecasts contained those which predicted 
some impact but for which no impact was found. Other predictions which were 
not consistent but not definitively inaccurate were labelled "complex, essentially 
inaccurate". Finally, monitoring activities discovered some impacts which either 
were not identified in the EIS or were significantly understated. These were 
classified as "unanticipated" and "underanticipated" impacts, respectively. 
While most of the 239 forecasts audited fell into one of the two above 
broad categories, others did not. Some forecasts, for example, could not be so 
categorized because of the possibility that the impact had not yet occurred while 
in other cases the actual impact was disputed or was deemed "wholly spurious". 
These general categories and subgroups of forecast/impact types are summarized 
. F. 4 7 m tgure ·-· 
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Because the seventeen accuracy classifications were nominal categories, 
they did not permit in-depth analysis. However, Culhane (1987a) suggested that 
the classifications could be arranged into a hierarchy of four ranks which formed 
something of a natural ordinal index. "Consistent" forecasts received the highest 
ranking while "inconsistent" received the lowest (see Figure 4.3). Each of the 239 
forecasts was assigned one of these ranks and the mean ordinal was calculated 
and used as a measure of forecast accuracy. The forecasts were also sub-divided 
into four groups on the basis of impact type, e.g. physiographic, biological, 
economic and social. The mean ordinal was then calculated for each impact 
group (Culhane. 1987a:372-373). 
In rerms of evaluating Culhane's (1987a) assessment of forecast accuracy, 
the absence of complere details of the method used prevents a comprehensive 
review. For example, the two reports describing rhis audit investigation, (Culhane, 
1987a and Culhane, 1987b), contain little information with respect to the coding 
scheme employed, other than the total number of codes involved. As a 
consequence, there still exist some unresolved problems with the information that 
is provide d. 
The first is of a technical nature. In bmh descriptions, (Culhane, 1987a 
and Culhane, 1987b), a summary table is provided which describes the match 
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Figure 4.3: Culhane's (1987a) Ordinal Ranking of the Accuracy Classifications 
Rank 4: -complex 
- complex, but arguably accurate 
Rank 3: - within range of vague forecast 
- no clear impact, none forecast 
- accuracy intuitively obvious 
- impact has not yet occurred 
Rank "'). - complex, essentially inaccurate '-• 
- impact exceeds forecast 
- impact less than forecast 
- impact disputed 
- impact wholly spurious 
- unanticipated, but beneficial 
- underanticipated, but beneficial 
- no clear impact, some impact forecast 
Rank 1: - inconsistent 
- unanticipated, but adverse 
- underanticipated, but adverse 
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between the forecast and actual impact. For each of the four impact groups, i.e. 
physiographic, biological, economic, social and for the total number of forecasts 
audited, a breakdown of the number of forecasts falling within each of the 
seventeen categories and the four ranks is provided. In addition, the mean 
accuracy ordinal is calculated for each of the five groups of forecasts. However, 
the exact results of the investigation are uncertain in that there are inconsistencies 
in these two tables. For example, in one table the mean ordinal for the 
physiographic impacts is 2.88 and for the total number of forecasts is 2.81, while 
in the other report, the values given for these same impact groups are 2. 83 and 
2. 80. respectively. 
In addition to these differences, discrepancies exist within the individual 
tables in that some of the average ordinals outlined do not coincide with the 
indicated number of forecasts within each of the four ranks. For example, the 
mean accuracy ordinal for the 52 physiographic impacts is given as 2.88 (Culhane, 
1987b:233) but my re-calculations based on the rankings of these forecasts within 
the table yield a value of 2. 92. Similar calculation errors are also found with 
respect to the average ordinals for the economic, social and total number of 
forecasts in Culhane (1987b) and for the physiographic and economic impact 
groups in Culhane (1987a). 
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Other questions anse with respect to some of the classifications employed 
as well as the rankings assigned to these classifications. For example, it is unclear 
as to what is meant by the classifications II impact disputed" and II impact wholly 
spurious II. Furthermore, the inclusion of these two categories along with the 
II impact has not yet occurred" group in an evaluation of accuracy is questionable. 
How can one reach any conclusion with respect to a prediction's success if the 
actual project outcome, upon which the success is gauged, is unknown? 
Another problem associated with the categorizing and ranking scheme 
concerns those impacts identified as "unanticipated" and llunderanticipated". A 
distinction is made between and separate categories created for beneficial 
unanticipated impacts, adverse unanticipated impacts, beneficial underanticipated 
impacts and adverse underanticipated impacts. When ranking the above four 
impact categories. those two representing outcomes of a beneficial nature were 
assigned a ranking of 2 while the pair of adverse impact groups received the 
lowest ranking of 1. Given that a higher rank value indicates a greater degree of 
accuracy, this particular assignment of rankings would seem to suggest that 
unanticipated and underanticipated impacts which are beneficial are more 
accurate than similarly categorized impacts of a negative nature. One could 
argue. however, that the attribute of "beneficialityll is unrelated to the measure of 
accuracy and thus should not be considered when evaluating forecast accuracy. 
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This, then, brings into question Culhane's (1987a) categorization and ranking on 
the basis of beneficiality as well as the meanmg and relevance of the vanous 
mean accuracy ordinals. 
In order to determine the influence of the above dubious categories and 
their associated rankings on the mean accuracy ordinals, Culhane's (1987a) 
summary table of forecast accuracy was modified. Under this revised approach, 
those categories containing forecasts for which the project outcomes were 
uncertain, i.e. "impact has not yet occurred"; "impact disputed"; and "impact wholly 
spurious", were eliminated from the evaluation. As well, both "unanticipated" 
categories were excluded because there were no corresponding forecasts for these 
impacts in the initial EIS documents. This is not to suggest, however, that the 
identification and acknowledgement of such unforeseen impacts is not of value 
but rather that the schema employed by Culhane is capable of measuring only the 
accuracy outcomes predicted and cannot be used to evaluate those outcomes not 
originally considered. 
While the "unanticipated" categories were removed, the "underanticipated" 
categories were not. However, both "beneficial" and "adverse" groups were 
collapsed into one category which was then placed in the lowest rank. (see Table 
4.1) 
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Table 4.1: Revised Version of Culhane's (1987a) Forecast Accuracy Summary 
Rank/Classification Physiographic Biological Economic Social Total 
4 -Close 19 8 9 29 65 
-Complex 1 0 1 2 4 
3 - Within range of vague 12 9 15 28 64 
forecast 1 2 4 5 12 
- No impact/none forecast 
- Intuitively obvious 1 2 0 2 5 
2 - Complex/inaccurate l l 0 0 2 
- Exceeds forecast 2 0 5 3 10 
- Less than forecast 5 3 9 8 25 
-No impact/some forecast 1 3 11 3 18 
l - Inconsistent 5 1 3 6 5 
- Underamicipated 2 1 2 0 5 
Totals 50 30 59 86 225 
Mean Accuracy Ordinals 2.94 2.90 2.58 3.06 2.88 
Culhane's (1987a) 2.89 2.82 2.51 3.00 2.80 
Mean Accuracy Ordinals 
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The above exclusions and modifications reduced the total number of 
auditable forecasts to 225. The mean accuracy ordinal was then calculated for 
each of the four major types of impacts as well as the total number audited. The 
results indicate that in all cases the modified mean accuracy ordinal is higher than 
that outlined in Culhane (1987a). However, the relative accuracy of the five 
impact groups does not change. That is to say, social impact forecasts received 
the highest mean ordinal followed in turn by physiographic, biological, total 
number of and finally economic impact forecasts. 
This, then, leads to the question of interpreting such statistics. For 
example, when referring to Culhane's (1987a) results, what does it mean that on a 
ranking scale from 1 - 4 the 89 social forecasts in the sample of 236 had a mean 
accuracy ordinal 0.48 higher than that of the 65 economic forecasts? And how 
does one interpret the finding that the mean accuracy ordinal for all forecasts is 
2.88? 
While it may be argued that the mean accuracy ordinals provide a means 
of comparing the forecasts for the various impact types, the relevance or utility of 
such findings, in terms of improving the environmental assessment process, is 
questionable. Aside from being an interesting academic exercise or in revealing 
our relative ability in precisely forecasting project development outcomes, such 
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results would seem to have mmor feedback value to the EIA practitioner, the EIS 
author or the decision-maker. 
These criticisms notwithstanding, the audit investigation undertaken by 
Culhane ( 1987a) is among the first of such large-scale multi-project follow-up 
studies focusing upon the consequences of project developments relative to those 
outcomes predicted and raises a number of important issues. In particular, it 
served to highlight some of the obstacles to and pre-requisites for effective 
auditing, the drawbacks of many environmental impact statements prepared to 
date and the inadequacy of the subsequent monitoring programs that have been 
established. 
4.1.5 Generalized Auditing Procedure 
Turning to the procedures for auditing the socio-economic impacts of the 
Hibernia project, the general steps involved in conducting an impact prediction 
audit derived from the review of audits performed to date are outlined in Figure 
4.4. These procedures were then applied to those socio-economic impact 
predictions generated for the Hibernia project. Details of the audit procedure 
and the results are presented in Chapter V. 
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Figure 4.4: General Steps Involved in an Environmental Impact Prediction Audit 
Define Prediction/Forecast 
~lr 
Generate List of Predictions 
r 
Screening of Predictions 
~lr 
Auditable Prediction Data Set 
,r 
Actual Project Impacts 
- monitoring impacts 
- key participants 
... ~ 
Actual Impacts Data Set 
~lr 
Comparison of Predicted and Actual Impacts 
~ 
Results/Conclusions 
Chapter V SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT AUDIT OF THE 
HIBERNIA PROJECT 
5. 1 The Hibernia Socio-Economic Impact Audit: Procedure 
The procedure used for the Hibernia audit is outlined in Figure 5.1. This 
procedure is based upon, and closely resembles, the general auditing method 
outlined in Chapter IV. However, as was the case in most of the audits reviewed, 
the method for this audit was modified somewhat to accommodate the specifics of 
the Hibernia project. 
This audit focuses upon those predictions, some of which were made 
initially in 1985 and others in 1991, which address the site preparation and early 
development phases of the Hibernia gravity base structure (GBS) construction 
project and the subsequent outcomes which have occurred between 1990 and 
1995. 
The definition of impact prediction adopted for this audit is based upon a 
review of the EIA audit literature and is taken as: 
any statement identifying change, and including direction of such 
change, to the social and economic environments in Newfoundland 
and which is directly attributable to the Hibernia project. 
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Figure 5.1: Components of the Auditing Method Employed for 
the Hibernia Project 
Issue Identification 
-review HEAP report 
~ 
Definition of Impact Prediction 
~ 
Identification of Impact Prediction 
~ 
Screening 
- precise wording 
- relatedness 
- relevance of prediction (review EPP) 
- monitoring data 
~ 
Auditable Predictions Data Set 
~ 
Identification of Actual Impacts 
-review monitoring data 
- key personnel 
~ 
Actual Impacts Data Set 
~ 




The initial step of the audit involved an examination of the Report of the 
Hibernia Environmental Assessment Panel (HEAP, 1985) in order to identify the 
socio-economic issues of concern at the time that the EIS was subject to public 
review. Once a list of issues was compiled, Volume rv of the Hibernia 
Environmental Impact Statement (Mobil, 1985), which addresses socio-economic 
concerns, was content-analyzed to identify the predictions made with respect to 
these issues. 
Once the compilation of a list of predictions was complete, each of the 
predictions was assessed using a series of screening criteria to determine those 
which were suitable for audit. The first screening was conducted to identify those 
predictions which contain precise wording, excluding those statements of a vague 
and general nature. Next, the remaining precisely worded predictions were 
screened to identify those specific to the Hibernia project, i.e. "implied" and 
"conditional" predictions as defined by Davies and Sadler (1990:22) and Clark 
et.al.(l987:527), were excluded. 
The next stage in the screening process involved assessing the relevance of 
each remaining prediction to the newly chosen GBS construction site to address 
the fact that the location for the site was changed after EIS completion and 
project approval had been granted. To achieve this Volume rV --the socio-
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economic component --of the Hibernia Development Project Platform 
Construction Sites Environmental Protection Plan (EPP) (NODECO, 1991) was 
reviewed and those predictions which were no longer relevant excluded from 
further analysis. 
When developing the EPP, NODECO reviewed the Hibernia Development 
Project EIS, the HEAP Report and other documents associated with the Panel's 
review, and liaised with local residents to identify project-related issues and 
concerns. The EPP, then, provides a 1991 update of the key project-related socio-
economic tssues. In particular, it discusses those issues associated with the newly 
selected GBS construction site at Bull Arm, Trinity Bay. However, unlike the EIS 
which contains predictions for both the St. John's and Come By Chance impact 
areas, the scope of the EPP is primarily the Local [mpact Area surrounding the 
Bull Arm site (see Map 3.2). This is the same as che Come By Chance impact 
area discussed in the EIS. Thus, the issues within the EPP were compared to 
those of the EIS to determine those no longer relevant, any new issues which may 
have arisen after the writing of the EIS and any revisions to the still-relevant EIS 
predictions. EIS impact predictions related to issues no longer relevant or which 
had been amended within the EPP were excluded from the audit while any 
revised or newly formulated predictions within the EPP were added to the list. 
The final stage in the screemng process involved determining those 
predictions for which appropriate and adequate monitoring data were available. 
Only these were considered to be auditable predictions. 
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For the audit to be complete, it was necessary to identify the actual socJo-
economtc outcomes of the Hibernia project. This information was obtained from 
monitoring programs which have been undertaken. Persons associated with 
project activities, such as personnel from HMDC, NODECO, BAACC and 
government, were contacted either to determine what monitoring data existed or, 
in some cases, to obtain explanation and/or clarification of the data. 
The actual project consequences were then compared with those predicted 
in the EIS and the EPP. The results of this comparison served as the bas is for 
assessing the accuracy of the auditable predictions. 
5. 2 The Impact Identification and Screening Components of the Hibernia 
Audit 
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5 .2. 1 An Overview of the Results of the Prediction Identification and Screening 
Activities 
The documents reviewed to identify impact predictions were the ErS and the 
subsequent GBS EPP developed for the production platform construction phase 
of the Hibernia project. In total, 193 predictions were identified; 143 in the EIS 
and the remaining 50 in the EPPs. When the predictions were screened and 
coded. based on the criteria described below. many could not be audited. For 
example, only 78 EIS predictions and 29 EPP predictions -- 107 in total -- were 
identified as meeting the necessary criteria for audir. However, an additional 21 
EIS predictions were excluded from the audit either because they were no longer 
relevant in light of subsequent changes to the project or they were updated by 
predictions in the EPP. Thus, 86 of the original 193 predictions were identified as 
"suitable" for audit. 
The existing project monitoring data were then reviewed to determine 
which of the 86 predictions could be audited. Monitoring data were either non-
existent or inadequate for 78 of these predictions. Thus, in the end, only eight of 
the 193 predictions identified could be followed up to assess their accuracy. A 
more detailed description of the prediction identification and screening 
components is provided in the sections which follow. 
5.2.2 Identification of Impact Predictions 
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The initial step of the audit involved the identification of key issues using the 
report of the Hibernia Environmental Assessment Panel (HEAP, 1985). The 
categories of socio-economic issues addressed within the Hibernia EIS 
corresponded to the social and economic issues of concern raised during the 
public hearings and outlined in the HEAP Report (Mobil, 1985)(see Table 5.1). 
Predictions within the EIS relating to these impact categories are outlined 
for three impact areas: St. John's, Come By Chance and Argentia. However, 
when the GBS construction site was changed from Adam's Head, Placentia Bay to 
the Bull Arm, Trinity Bay location, Argentia was no longer considered an impact 
area. As a result, during the review of the EIS for prediction identification, those 
sections involving Argentia were not considered and the content-analysis for 
predictions was limited to those sections relevant to the St. John's and Come By 
Chance impact areas. 
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Table 5.1: The Number of Impact Predictions Under Each of the Ten Socio-
Economic Impact Categories Within Volume IV of the Hibernia EIS 
I Impact Category II Number of Predictions I 
1. Industry 3 
2. Employment 4 
3. Demography 6 
4. The Fishery 13 
5. Housing 12 
6. Public Services/Commercial and 21 
Industrial r nfrastructure 
7. Community/Social I nfras true ture 67 
8. Land and Resource Use 9 
9. Municipal Government and Finance 3 
10. Newfoundland Social Fabric 5 
I Total II 143 l 
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The EIS content-analysis yielded 143 socio-economic impact predictions. 
The ten impact categories contained within Volume IV of the EIS are outlined m 
Table 5. 1 along with the number of predictions identified within each category. 
The list of predictions included general, non-quantitative statements of 
change, as exemplified by the following prediction regarding project impacts on 
tourism in the province: 
Overall. the tourism industry could be positively affected by project 
activities. since construction of the Fixed Production System might 
be of interest to Newfoundlanders and visitors from outside the 
province (Mobil, 1985:323). 
Other predictions consisted of tables containing quantitative data. Where 
such tables contained more than one item, i.e. predicted values for several years, 
all items in the table were treated as only one prediction. As an example, Table 
4.5-5 within Volume IV of the Hibernia EIS provides demographic projections for 
the St. John's Impact Area. Of these, the values for the years 1986-1990 as well 
as the cumulative value for 1990 were included as part of the audit data, however 
these six values were counted as only one prediction. 
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[t must also be pointed out that, due to the unforeseen delays in the 
project schedule, time-related modifications to some of the predictions were 
necessary. Project development activities initially were scheduled to commence m 
1986. As a result, the EIS contains predictions starting with this year and 
spanning the period up to and including the year 2006. However, construction 
development activities were delayed some four years and work on the production 
platform did not begin until October 1990. As a consequence, when assessing the 
accuracy of the predictions, a straightforward comparison of the predicted and the 
actual values is not possible. As an example, the predicted housing demand value 
for 1991 in the EIS cannot be compared to the actual demand in 1991 as that year 
in the EIS represents year six in the original project schedule whereas in reality 
1991 was on! y the second year. Since no updating of the predictions was 
undertaken by the project proponent, in order to address this mismatch in data, 
EIS predictions for the years 1986, 1987, 1988. 1989 J.nd 1990 -- the initially-
anticipated first five years of operations -- were compared to the results for the 
actual first five years of project activities, i.e. 1990. 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994. 
5. 2. 3 Screening and Coding of Impact Predictions 
Prior to predicted-actual impact companson, each of the 143 predictions was 





wording of prediction too general for audit 
prediction contingent upon other events which have not taken place 
prediction no longer relevant due to project changes 
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prediction is a descriptive statement of quantitative data presented 
a repetitive statement of impact already discussed 
prediction suitable for audit 
Based upon the above classification scheme, more than half of the 
predictions, 78 (54.5%), were determined as suitable for audit while 65 (45.5%) 
were considered unsuitable. Seventeen (11. 9%) of the 143 predictions contained 
wording that was too general or vague for auditing purposes. Similarly, 17 
( 11.9%) were no longer relevant as a result of changes to project design and 
location. Eleven (7. 7%) of the predictive statements were repetitious of a 
previously discussed prediction. Another seven predictions (4.9%) were 
conditional upon events which have not occurred and the same number were 
classified as descriptive statements of quantitative data presented. Finally, six 
(4.2 %) of the predictions are not yet relevant as they involve 
Table 5.2: Summary of Classification and Category for the 143 EIS Impact Predictions 
*Lah:gury/ ludustry EmployJUCIII UeuwgraJlhY Fishery lluusiug l'ublic C ummercial/ Laud/ Municipal Nlld. Total 
Classilicatiou Services Sucial Resuurce Govt/ Sofia! 
lufrastmcture Usc Fiuaucc Fabric 
(;cucral(G) 3 0 I () () 2 3 2 2 4 17 
Couditiuuai(C) () () () 3 0 2 2 0 0 0 7 
No Lougcr () 0 I ') 0 4 0 2 0 I 17 
ltdcvaut INR) 
Nut Yet 0 () () I () 0 5 0 0 0 6 
l{clnaut (NYI{) 
llesu-i Jlli vc u u () \) 5 () 2 0 0 () 7 
Statcu1cut (llS) 
Repetitive () () (J \1 3 I b 0 I () II 
Statement (R) 
Suitable for 0 4 4 () 4 12 49 5 0 0 7lS 
Audit (S) 
I Tutal I 3 I 4 I b I 13 I 12 I 21 I 67 I 9 I 3 I 5 I 143 I 
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a future time frame. Table 5.2 summarizes the classification of predictions within 
each of the ten impact categories. 
The majority of the total set of predictions identified in Table 5.2 relate to 
commercial and social infrastructure issues with a total of 67 (42.2 %). The 
category involving public services is the next largest with 21 predictions (14.7%) 
followed by the categories involving fishery issues and housing issues with thirteen 
(9.2%) and twelve (8.5 %), respectively. The land and resource use category 
contains nine predictions (6.3 %) while the remaining five categories each contain 
six or less predictions. 
In terms of those predictions suitable for audit, 78 (54.5%) of the 143 
predictions in Table 5.2 fall into this category. In the case of four of the ten 
categories -- Industry, Fishery, Municipal Government/Finance and Newfoundland 
Social Fabric -- none of the predictions made in the EIS were included for audit. 
The relevance of some of the above predictions is significantly affected by 
the five year delay between the time that the EIS was completed and 
commencement of project activities. Similarly, the post-EIS decision to move the 
GBS construction site to Bull Arm has significantly affected the relevance of many 
of the predictions. While the GBS construction project was exempted from the 
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provincial EIA procedures, this exemption was granted subject to the development 
and implementation of an Environmental Protection Plan (EPP), which outlines 
procedures to be employed to eliminate or reduce the adverse project impacts and 
to enhance any beneficial outcomes (see section 3.2.5.1). As a consequence, the 
GBS contractor compiled an Environmental Protection Plan (EPP) (NODECO, 
1991). Because the EPP provides an update of the socio-economic issues of 
concern associated with the project, it was content-analysed for predictions. The 
content-analysis of the EPP produced 50 predictions which were screened and 
coded. Twenty-rrine of the predictions prove suitable for audit while of the 
remaining 21. five contain phraseology too vague or general, fifteen are not yet 
relevant and one was repetitive of a prediction idemified earlier in the documerrts 
(Table 5.3). 
To illustrate the different codes assigned to •he predictions, specific 
predictions taken from the EPP are presented below. The following prediction 
specifically identifies the likely number of commuters travelling to and from the 
GBS site on a daily basis. As a result, this prediction was coded as suitable for 
audit. 
lt is estimated that a peak of 650 workers may commute on a daily 
basis between the site and a variety of communities (NODECO, 
1991 :4-l 0). 
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Table 5.3: EPP Predictions: Classification and Category Summary 
Impact Category Number of Predictions *Classification 
l. Employment I s 
2. Demography I s 
3. Housing 4 S(3); G 
4. Public Services/ 
Conm1ercial!Industrial 7 S(7) 
Infrastructure 
5. Community /Social IO S(lO) 
Infrastructure 
6. Land & Resource Use I G 
7. Social Fabric 2 G(2) 






S(29) ;R(l) ;G(5) ;NYR(15) 
I 
+ S: prediction suitable for audit: G: wording of prediction too general for audit: R: repetitive statement of impact already 
discussed: NYR: prediction not yet relevant 
This next prediction, on the other hand, is very general in describing the 
potential impacts of the project on local society and culture: 
new interest groups which gain legitimacy because of the project, 
may emerge within the community and become a permanent 
component of its social infrastructure (NODECO, 1991:4-19). 
l2l 
This specific prediction was excluded from the audit because of its vagueness. 
Many of the predictions in the EPP involved impacts relating to activities 
in the project schedule which have not yet occurred. These were coded as "Not 
Yet Relevant" and obviously could not be audited. For example, the prediction 
which follows addresses the potential interference to fishery/marine traffic when 
construction of the Hibernia production platform is completed and is being towed 
out to the oilfield: 
The transport of the Platform from the top of Trinity Bay to the 
Hibernia Oilfield may interfere with fishing vessels or other marine 
traffic operating along the proposed route (NODECO, 1991 :4-4). 
The socio-economic issues addressed in the EPP were compared to those 
in the EIS. It was found that some of the issues discussed within the EIS were 
excluded from the scope of the EPP as they were deemed no longer relevant, 
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while those still relevant were updated in the latter document. Predictions 
associated with the irrelevant issues were eliminated from the list and those 
outdated were replaced by those revised in the EPP. In the end, 21 of the 78 EIS 
predictions were struck from the list and 29 EPP predictions added to it for a 
total of 86 "suitable" predictions. It should be reiterated that because the EPP 
concerns only the Local Impact Area, none of the predictions added to or 
removed from the list relate to the St. John's Impact Area. 
5. 2.4 Monitoring of Impact Predictions 
Those predictions identified as suitable for audit were then reviewed in light of 
the available project monitoring data. The results of this review indicate that of 
the 86 predictions, 67 (77. 9%) could not be follo\ved e1p due to a lack of project 
monitoring data. Of the 19 predictions (22. 1 %) for \V h ich monitoring has been 
conducted, the data available for eleven of these are insufficient or inadequate to 
evaluate their accuracy. As a result, only eight predictions (9.3%) were auditable. 
The eight predictions included for audit fall into four impact categories: 
two are employment-related; three involve housing issues; one is of a 
demographic nature; and two are fishery-related (see Table 5.4). 
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Number of Predictions 
I 
l. Employment 2 
2. Demography 1 
3. Housing 3 







This absence of monitoring data is not due to the fact that the monitoring 
of impacts was not considered. In fact, the importance of monitoring was 
discussed during the public hearing process and was highlighted as one of the 
recommendations of the Hibernia Environmental Assessment Panel (HEAP, 
1985), and commitments were subsequently made in the EPP to monitor both the 
project-related bio-physical and socio-economic impacts. 
A provincial government management structure was developed to oversee 
the project in which the Hibernia Construction Sites Environmental Management 
Committee (HCSEMC) is the body responsible for coordinating monitoring 
associated with the GBS construction (see secuon 3.2.5.3.). Since the start of the 
project, HMDC and NODECO have been responsible for the bio-physical 
monitoring at the GBS site and a custom-designed monitoring program has been 
established. For example, a five year marine em ironmental effects monitoring 
program for the GBS construction site has been designed to measure sediment 
levels and numbers of blue mussels and winter t1ounder in the Bull Arm area 
(LGL Limited, 1994). In addition, NODECO. in its EPP, outlines a self-
regulatory environmental compliance monitoring program wherein it was to 
monitor its own activities for compliance with laws. regulations, permits, 
authorizations and contractual or environmental impact assessment agreements 
(NODECO, 1991:9-1). 
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The monitoring of the socio-economic impacts of project activities has been 
the responsibility of the provincial government. HCSEMC has required the 
companies to provide certain data -- housing, employment, site delivery traffic --
and has relied on government departments for other information. However, 
unlike the bio-physical monitoring programs, there has been no attempt to link 
the socio-economic monitoring results to the impact predictions through a 
hypothesis-testing approach. 
As a result of the above initiatives, monitoring has been and continues to 
be conducted. For example, HCSEMC since 1992 has been producing a quarterly 
review which summarizes the monitoring of such socio-economic variables as on-
site employment, the proportion of project employment occurring in each of the 
four provincial economic regions, training, social assistance, daycare/pre-school 
enrolment and residential/commercial land sales. HMDC also produces quarterly 
housing reports which describe the distribution and quantity of project 
accommodations within St. John's and the Local Impact Areas. Socio-economic 
issues are also summarized in HMDC' s Environmental Protection Plan Annual 
Reports. 
Notwithstanding the commitments to and the assignment of responsibility 
for monitoring. to date, the monitoring of the socio-economic impacts associated 
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with Hibernia has been deficient in several respects. The first involves the 
tardiness of implementing certain monitoring programs and studies. For example, 
the responsibility for monitoring the socio-economic impacts of the GBS 
construction project lies with HCSEMC. While project activities at the GBS site 
began in October 1990, a socio-economic monitoring program was not formally 
approved by HCSEMC until January 1993, some two years and four months later. 
Furthermore, the effective monitoring of many of the social and economic impacts 
is contingent upon knowledge of the demographic activity associated with the 
project. However, the initial study of the demographic impacts within the Local 
Impact Area was not completed until May 1994 (Newfoundland Statistics Agency, 
1994). As another example, the potential increase in housing rental rates within 
the Local Impact Area and the negative consequences of such an increase for 
people on low and fixed incomes is an issue discussed within both the EIS and the 
EPP. However, it is not possible to determine whe~:1er such an increase has 
occurred as pre-Hibernia baseline studies were not conducted and that the first 
rental market survey for the Local Impact Area was not undertaken until 1994, 
with the final report being submitted to the Hibernia Project Monitoring 
Committee (see section 3.2.5.3) in November of that year. 
Other weaknesses of the socio-economic monitoring being undertaken are 
associated with its process, purpose and function. The monitoring process 
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includes the collection, storage, retrieval and analysis of data. The analysis 
component involves a comparison of the results at different time intervals in order 
to identify any changes that have occurred and to assess their significance and 
their relationship to the project (Storey et.a/.,1991:5-6). 
The monitoring process for several of the Hibernia-related . . socto-economtc 
components has been incomplete in that data are being collected but the analysis 
phase of the process is lacking. The traffic movement data set is a case in point. 
One of the issues of concern discussed in the EPP is the potential increase in 
traffic along the Trans-Canada Highway associated with the GBS construction site 
at Bull Arm. In particular, concerns were raised about the increased traffic 
congestion at certain times of the week and the potential hazard to children being 
bussed to school. To address the congestion concerns, traffic counters were 
placed at various locations along the Trans-Canada in proximity to the Bull Arm 
site. Over the past several years a data set has been compiled, however, up to the 
time of writing no comprehensive analysis of these data had been carried out. 
With regard to the potential increased risk to school bussing, efforts have 
been made to track the number of project-related vehicles traversing the school 
bus routes during the peak morning and afternoon bussing periods. The volume 
of such project-related traffic is provided within some of the monitoring reports. 
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However, the significance of these statistics is not described. For example, such 
questions as to whether this volume of traffic is acceptable, whether it 
compromises the safety of the school children, how this traffic compares with 
non-project traffic and whether the cumulative effect of project and non-project 
traffic is problematic are not addressed within the monitoring reports. 
Consequently any predictions associated with this issue cannot be subject to audit 
as there are no or insufficient data to do so. 
Table 5.5 summarizes the results of the prediction identification and the 
screening components of the Hibernia socio-economic impact audit. The 
prediction identification procedures yielded a total of 193 predictions, 143 in the 
EIS and 50 in the EPP. Of these, 185 were excluded from the audit for the 
following reasons: 22 were imprecisely phrased: se\·en were contingent upon other 
conditions which did not materialize; 38 were no longer relevant given the existing 
project context: 21 were couched in a future time frame; seven were descriptions 
of quantitative data; twelve were repetitive predictions: and 78 predictions could 
not be assessed due either to a lack of or insufficient project monitoring data. 
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Table 5.5: Summary of Results of the Screening Component 
Prediction Classification Number of Predictions 
General (G) 22 
Conditional (C) 7 
.\lo Longer Relevant (NR) 38 
.\lot Yet Relevant (NYR) 21 
Descriptive Statement (DS) 7 
Repetitive Statement (R) 12 
Insufficient MonitOring Data (IM) 11 
.\Ia Project MonitOring Data Available (NM) 67 







5. 3 Accuracy of the Eight Auditable Impact Predictions 
The eight auditable predictions fell into two general categories, those of a non-
quantitative nature and those containing quantitative data. There were three 
predictions in the first category while the remaining five predictions were couched 
in quantitative terms. 
5. 3. 1 Non-Quantitative Predictions 
The three non-quantitative predictive statements were found to be accurate 
descriptions of actual project outcomes. Two of these predictions address 
potential impacts on the fishery, and in particular predict that project -related 
traffic may result in damage to fishing gear in the Bull Arm area, while the other 
prediction involves house and land prices in the St. John's area. 
Fishery Impacts 
The Environmental Protection Plan (NODECO, 1991) for the GBS construction 
project in the Bull Arm area outlines the potential effects on the various socio-
economic and bio-physical environmental components. The two predictions 
involving the fishery which were included for audit were specific to the site 
development phase and GBS construction and Topsides fabrication activities m 
the drydock. The two predictive statements are presented below: 
Movement of project vessels within a designated traffic lane down 
Trinity Bay and into Bull Arm may interfere with normal fishing and 
vessel operations ... damage fishing gear or fishing boats along the 
traffic route ... (NODECO, 1991:4-2). 
Project vessels which do not confine themselves to the designated 
traffic lane may damage gear or fishing vessels operating along both 
sides of the traffic lane route (NODECO, 1991:4-6). 
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Project information indicates that some damage to gear has been reported. 
In 1992 two claims for fishing net damage were made and subsequently settled to 
the satisfaction of both the claimants and the project management (HMDC, 
1994). 
Housing Impacts 
The other prediction within this category addresses potential increases in house 
and land prices in the St. John's area. It was predicted that project demands 
would not result in a significant increase in either land or house prices: 
neither land nor house prices are expected to increase significantly 
as a direct result of the demands of the [Hibernia] development 
(Mobil, 1985:263). 
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The monitoring data indicate that the housing demands associated with the 
project were easily absorbed by existing supply and did not result in a rise in the 
price of land or houses, which is consistent with that predicted. In fact, according 
to data collected by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), 
Hibernia personnel have helped absorb some of the higher priced houses on the 
market in the St. John's area. In terms of increased house prices, according to 
CMHC average MLS sale prices in the St. John's area rose only marginally from 
$88,993 in 1990 to $92,011 in 1994, an increase of 3.4 percent (Woodman, pers. 
comm., 1995). However, whether this increase was a direct result of Hibernia 
could not be determined. 
In any event, Hibernia activities did not result in significant increased 
demand for housing in St. John's. To date there has not been a need for specific 
action in terms of constructing additional housing units or developing additional 
building lots as a result of the project. As a consequence, the price of houses and 
land in the area was not significantly affected. 
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5 .3.2 Quantitative Predictions 
Of the five predictions within this category, two address employment issues within 
the Local Impact Area, one involves the incremental resident increases at the 
work camp and the remaining two consist of annual incremental housing forecasts 
for the St. John's and Local Impact Areas. Monitoring data indicate that project 
outcomes are not consistent with any of these five quantitative predictions. 
Employment Predictions 
The first of these predictions concerns the number of project-related jobs to be 
created in the Local Impact Area. Table 5.6 contains both the predicted and 
actual annual number of jobs (in persons) for 1990 to 1994. As indicated, some 
predictions over-estimate while others fall short of the jobs actually created. For 
example, it is predicted that by 1992 the number of project jobs would reach 1,155 
while only 898, or 77.7 percent of the predicted value, were reported. However, 
in 1994 the job total was 4,019-- 77.4 percent higher than the 2,265 predicted in 
the ElS. 
The second employment-related prediction describes the peak number of 
workers at the Bull Arm site: 
Table 5.6: Predicted and Actual Number of Hibernia Jobs Created in the 













Predicted 250 850 1155 1465 2265 
Actual 116 972 898 3060 4019 
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It is estimated that the GBS construction project will employ, at 
peak, in the order of 3,600 workers at the Bull Arm site. The 
number of employed will rise from 1, 600 in the 2nd quarter of 1992 
to 3, 600 in the 2nd quarter of 1993, and remain constant until the 
end of 1993. The labour force will decline rapidly to 2, 600 in the 
first half of 1994 and decrease from 2, 500 at the end of 1994 to 
close to zero by the end of 1995 (NODECO, 1992:4-5). 
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However, project information indicates that the actual number of workers at the 
Bull Arm site has surpassed that originally predicted. For example, as of July 
1995, the total workforce on site was reported as 5, 779 -- 61 percent higher than 
the 3, 600 forecast. 
Work Camp Predictions 
A major concern expressed during the Hibernia public hearings was the project's 
potential adverse demographic impacts in the communities adjacent to the GBS 
construction site, particularly in terms of housing and community services. In 
order to avoid or lessen such impacts, a self-contained work camp was constructed 
at the Bull Arm site. The capacity and elements of this work camp are outlined 
in the Hibernia EIS (Mobil, 1985). 
The EIS outlines the annual work camp increments for 1990-1994 as well 
as the cumulative value for 1994. Again, the individual increments predicted 
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differ from those realized, sometimes above and other times below the reported 
levels (see Table 5.7). However, similar to the on-site workforce, the 1994 actual 
cumulative accommodation level is considerably above the predicted value. For 
example, it is forecast that at the end of 1994 work camp occupants would total 
1, 465. However, as of June of that year, the reported number was more than 
double this, as 2,969 persons were living on site. Since then, project design 
changes have resulted in an additional 480 individual rooms being added to the 
camp, bringing its total capacity up to 3,480. 
Household Forecasts 
The final two predictions consist of annual incremental household forecasts for 
the St. John's and the Local Impact Areas from 1990-1994 (see Table 5.8 and 
Table 5.9). In the case of St. John's, the project impact on housing demand is less 
than anticipated, with all the predicted increments exceeding those reported. 
While the difference between the predicted and actual is a high as 145 -- for 1992 
the predicted demand (210) is more than triple that actually reported (65) -- the 
difference in the 1994 cumulative demands is 31, 262 versus 231. In contrast, 
analysis of the Local Impact Area data (Table 5. 9) reveal that actual project 
demands generally surpass those predicted. however the differences were smaller 







Cumulative Increments at the Bull Arm Work Camp: Predicted and 












143 546 751 958 1465 
NA 673 642 2569 2969 
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Table 5.8: Cumulative Household Increments St. John's Impact Area: 
Predicted and Actual Values, 1990-1994 
I Year I 1990 I 1991 I 1992 I 1993 I 1994 I 
Predicted 41 67 210 234 262 
Actual NA NA 65 98 231 
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Table 5.9: Cumulative Household Increments Local Impact Area: 














Predicted 7 35 49 63 96 
Actual NA 56 80 90 91 
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difference. In 1992, 80 houses were occupied by project employees compared to a 
forecast of 49. In 1994, however, the actual demand is exceeded by that initially 
predicted. The difference in this case is only five -- 96 versus 91. 
5. 4 Predictive Accuracy and General Project Outcomes 
Because of the small number of predictions that were suitable for inclusion in the 
final audit, it is difficult to formulate any general conclusions regarding the 
accuracy of the Hibernia-related socio-economic impact predictions. 
However, based on the findings of the audit and other project information, 
only general comments can be made with respect to the nature of the actual 
project consequences. To date, the negative socio-economic impacts of the 
Hibernia project have been minimal and most project impacts generally have been 
positive. The project-related demographic changes have been such that any 
impacts have been easily absorbed while local industry and residents have 
benefitted from the business and employment opportunities associated with the 
project. In fact. for many areas of Newfoundland, the spin-offs from Hibernia 
have been the only bright spot in a generally declining economy over the past five 
years. 
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With regard to the adverse impacts of the project, these have proved much 
less significant than had been originally anticipated before and during the 
Hibernia public review. The mitigative measures designed and implemented thus 
far have been successful in addressing the potential problems identified in the 
project's impact assessment and review process. For example, the construction of 
the work camp at the GBS construction site has been effective in reducing the 
level of interaction between project employees and surrounding communities. As 
a result, the initial concerns regarding higher house prices, increased crime rates, 
an over-extension of existing public services and infrastructure and a general 
"erosion" of Newfoundland's "social fabric" have not materialized. 
The results of the Hibernia audit can be used to comment on certain 
aspects of EIA auditing, EIA itself and environmental planning. This audit 
investigation helps to identify the shortfalls and inadequacy of the approach to 
and current procedures employed in EIA auditing. The fact that only eight of the 
193 socio-economic impact predictions made for the Hibernia project are suitable 
for final audit suggests the need for an alternative auditing procedure and/or 
revision to the way in which EIS predictions are presented. Also, the standard 
focus of the EIA audit illustrates some underlying limitations of the contemporary 
EIA approach itself as well as the general environmental planning process. These 
issues comprise the focus of discussion in Chapter VI. 
Chapter VI THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS OF 
THE HIBERNIA AUDIT 
6.1 The Socio-Economic Impact Audit Procedure 
The procedure employed in the Hibernia audit is based primarily upon three case 
studies: the U.S. Audit (Culhane, 1987a); the United Kingdom Audit (Clark et.al., 
1987); and the Australian Audit (Buckley, 1991). The methods used in these 
studies were drawn upon to develop the method applied to the Hibernia project. 
It should be noted, however, that the Hibernia audit addresses socio-economic 
issues and has a single project focus, unlike the above three studies which were all 
multi-project investigations and dealt predominantly with bio-physical impact 
predictions. 
The findings from this audit mirror those of the above three case studies. 
Three general conclusions emerge from this and other audits. The first is that the 
required components for conducting the audit are either insufficient or absent. 
Three types of procedural difficulties are found -- nebulous wording of 
predictions, temporal factors and inadequate monitoring -- which result in a large 
proportion of the predictions being unsuited for audit (see section 5.3.3). The 
second conclusion is that the auditing method itself is weak. Finally, the results of 
the Hibernia and other audits bring into question the fundamental approach to 
auditing. These issues are discussed further in the sections which follow. 
6.2 Auditing Procedural Difficulties 
When conducting the Hibernia audit, many of the problems encountered fall 
within the three general categories of procedural difficulties identified in other 
audit case studies: the nature of the predictive statements; the temporal 
component of the predictions and the project: and the monitoring of project 
impacts (see section 2.3.4). 
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Volume IV of the Hibernia EIS primarily outlines the issues of concern 
and contains relatively few predictions, similar to Buckley's Australian findings 
(1991: 96). Furthermore, as is highlighted in several of the audit studies (Culhane, 
1987a:374; Clark et.al., 1987:530; McCallum, 1987:737; Canter, 1985:264; and 
Munro et. al., 1986: 12), the majority of the EIS predictions are non-quantitative 
and often are expressed in "vague and woolly language". 
Time-related difficulties described within the EIA auditing literature (see 
Clark et.al., 1987:530; McCallum, 1987:737; and Buckley, 1991:96) are also a 
limiting factor in the Hibernia audit. Most of the predictions identified contain 
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no time frame as to when the impacts are likely to occur. Also, the many delays 
to the Hibernia project schedule complicate the assessment of the predictions. A 
span of approximately five and a half years separated the completion date of the 
EIS and the commencement of project development activities at the Bull Arm 
GBS construction site. During this time interval, significant project changes 
occurred including the selection of the new site of GBS construction. As a result, 
many of the original predictions are irrelevant and many need to be modified m 
the light of new project information and changes in the "new-project" 
environment. 
The third procedural obstacle is the paucity of adequate monitoring data 
(see Buckley, 1991:96; CEARC, 1988:2-3; Sonntag, 1987:451; Munro et.al., 
1986:13; Canter. 1985:258; Murdock et.al., 1982:337; and Bisset, 1980:390). This is 
a major deficiency with respect to the socio-economic component of the Hibernia 
project as indicated by the fact that adequate project monitoring data are 
available for only eight of the 86 predictions identified as being suitable for audit 
(see section 5.2). 
Three general reasons for undertaking socio-economic monitoring have 
been identified: compliance; project impact management; and policy evaluation. 
In the first instance, the data collected may be used to ensure that the project is 
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operating in accordance with any agreements, regulations and legislation. In the 
second case, monitoring data may serve to identify undesirable unexpected 
consequences and allow for the development of responsive management measures. 
With respect to evaluation, the monitoring data may provide insight regarding the 
effectiveness of policies being implemented and developed (Storey et.al., 1991:5-
6). 
The inadequacy of the Hibernia socio-economic monitoring seems related 
to purpose for which the monitoring is being used. The main purpose of the 
momtormg undertaken for the project seems to be that of compliance, i.e. to 
ensure that monitoring commitments made within the EIS or the EPP are being 
fulfilled, and not specifically as a means for management. As a result, in some 
cases data have been collected or recorded but are of little value by way of 
managing project impacts. For example, one section within the HCSEMC 
quarterly monitoring reports addresses social services. an issue of concern 
idenrified within the EIS and EPP. It is reported that within the Local Impact 
Area the social services caseloads have increased during the course of the project. 
However, it is then stated that these changes cannot be directly attributed to 
project activities. Thus. while the social services requirements within the Local 
Impact Area are being monitored, the monitoring is not designed to highlight 
project-related change. Consequently, the resultant data cannot provide critical 
feedback concerning actual project outcomes. Such feedback is the primary 
function of monitoring and is essential for effective project impact management 
(see section 2.5.1). 
6.3 A Revised EIS: Toward an Auditable Format 
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In order to overcome some of the problems associated with the auditing method 
employed in this Hibernia research, changes would have to be made at the EIS 
compilation stage. The general wording of such a large proportion of EIS 
predictions in the Hibernia case, as well as other case studies, indicates that the 
notion of auditing was not a consideration at the time of their writing. Several 
authors have described the "ideal" prediction for auditing purposes as one which is 
written in hypothesis format (Spaling et. al., 1993; and Beanlands and Duinker, 
1983) indicating the impact's magnitude, areal extent, time-scale, probability and 
significance (Clark et.al., 1987:528; Tomlinson and Atkinson, 1987b:260; and 
Culhane. 1987a:362)(see section 4.1.2). Such a format would work toward the 
development of the necessary monitoring programs and increase the proportion of 
auditable predictions. However, while the writing of such "ideal" predictions 
would solve some of the procedural difficulties, there remain other issues which 
warrant consideration. 
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6.4 The EIA Process: A Shift in Emphasis 
The primary objective of the EIA audits conducted to date has been to evaluate 
the accuracy of the predictions within the EIS by comparing these to the actual 
project outcomes. An implicit assumption of this approach is that the project and 
the future environment within which the project will occur will remain as 
originally projected. Only where the projected environment remains unaffected by 
exogenous changes and the project remains as originally conceived and 
implemented is it reasonable to expect that the predictions and outcomes will be 
similar and thus the comparison of predicted and actual project consequences 
would seem an acceptable approach. In reality, projects themselves and the 
context in which they exist are dynamic, such that changes in either may make the 
original predictions irrelevant. This is particularly so when there is a considerable 
time span between initial project definition and project completion. 
Such has been the case with the Hibernia project, where 16 years have 
elapsed since field discovery in 1979. During this period there have been 
significant changes to the project context. For example, advances in the area of 
oil field technology since the early 1980s have resulted in changes to project 
design. HMDC now plans to employ directional drilling techniques which allow 
the drilling of most wells from the production platform. This reduces the original 
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number of subsea components in the production area and thereby lowers the risk 
of damage to such components from icebergs. Also, the various fishing moratoria 
imposed in Newfoundland have dramatically changed the local economic and 
social circumstances. In such cases, the use of the original EIS predictions for 
audit is inappropriate, in that one would expect these predictions to be inaccurate 
given the changes which have occurred, and any predictions which did prove 
accurate would carry little credence. 
The typical EIS. is usually produced at a single point in time and is viewed 
as a definitive document of project outcomes. However, because the project can, 
and quite often does, change, the "static" EIS can rarely be meaningfully used as 
the basis for measuring expected change against actual change. In order to 
accommodate any project or environment changes, there needs to be a process 
which is dynamic and adaptive in nature. Given a set of goals and objectives for a 
project, the EIS must not be seen as the final product but rather as the "first cut" 
at impact identification and prediction. It has been suggested that the predictions 
within the EIS must be treated as perishable products with limited shelf-lives that 
require regular review and replacement (Storey, 1986:545). One way of achieving 
this is to revise the format of the EIS. Clark et.al. (1987:537), for example, 
propose that the EIS assume a loose-leaf form to allow for continual updating 
through additions and subtractions over the course of the project. Alternatively, 
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there may need to be fundamental changes to the philosophy underlying EIA and 
the EIA process which arises from this. 
Because the EIS document is a product of EIA, the limitations of the EIS 
retlect some of the underlying deficiencies in the EIA process itself. The current 
practice of EIA emphasizes the generation of project impact predictions. In most 
cases. Hibernia included, these predictions are made during the early stages of the 
planning process when there exists a high degree of uncertainty with respect to 
project parameters. 
Despite this, great efforts are made to produce impact predictions. In 
many cases, because of the limited data available and the absence of predictive 
"tools" (i.e. models), the predictions made are very general, non-specific or 
"woolly". In other cases, where the "tools" and some data exist and assumptions 
can be made. attempts are made to generate precise predictions. For example. 
under the demographic impact section within the Hibernia EIS (Mobil, 1985:394), 
the project-related population increase into the Come By Chance Impact Area 
from 1985-2006 is broken down by gender across eleven age groups ranging from 
0--+ years up to 50-55 years. These data indicate that in 1990, for example, of the 
newcomers to the area. there would be ten females· between 0-4 years of age, 37 
males in the 15-19 year range and three females 30-34 years old. While the 
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monitoring data are not available to assess the accuracy of these numbers, is it 
reasonable to expect them to be accurate given the uncertainty involved and the 
vanous assumptions used to generate these figures? And if the predictions did 
prove accurate, given the project changes which have since occurred, such an 
outcome could only be attributed to chance and could not be taken as an 
indication of effective predictive techniques. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the inability to accurately predict project 
development impacts is well-documented in the literature (see section 2.3.3), this 
does not impiy that the practices of prediction and assessment should be 
abandoned. In fact, when properly used they can serve a critical function in the 
management of the project (see section 6.5). The problem seems to lie in the 
type of predictions being made and the approach to EIA in general. 
There presently exists a strong preoccupation with predictive precision, 
whereby the pnmary focus is to quantify the demands of the project on the 
environmental variables in question. A widely held v1ew among EIA practitioners 
and EIS wrners is that the more quantitative and exact, the better the prediction, 
or as in the case of Duinker ( 1987), the only prediction worth having. Because of 
this preference and desire for quantitative precision, in many cases the prediction 
process becomes merely a "number crunching" exercise. As a result, quite often 
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these impact values are "artificial" and are, therefore, not very meaningful nor 
very useful in terms of managing project demands. Also, the exactness of these 
predictions implies a spurious accuracy which can result in erroneous expectations 
regarding project impacts. 
Because of the limitations of the existing process, it appears that a shift in 
emph.asis 1s necessary in contemporary EIA. What is required when assessing 
socio-economic impacts, is a shift from what might be described as a "demand" 
perspective to that of a "capacity" perspective. That is, rather than focusing upon 
the demands that the project will place upon the various components of the 
environment. it might be more appropriate to assess the existing capacities of 
these environmental components. 
Under the capacity approach, the need for predictive precision would be 
diminished. Prediction would still be essential but would require a different focus. 
Rather than attempting to calculate the impacts' exact quantitative values, the 
purpose of the prediction process would be to determine the magnitude of the 
impacts relative to the pre-determined supply thresholds of the various 
environmental components within the scope of the assessment. Thus, a more 
pragmatic approach to prediction, especially in the early stages of the project 
when the degree of uncertainty is typically highest, would involve generating 
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predictions containing a range of impacts, with a maximum and mm1mum, rather 
than a single value. Over time, as the project parameters become more clearly 
defined, the predicted range of impact could be adjusted accordingly. 
To use Hibernia as an example, there was concern that the project could 
place increased demands upon the existing housing stock within the Local Impact 
Area. In accordance with the demand approach, the project-related annual 
housing increments within this area were predicted for the life of the Project. 
Using the capacity approach, an assessment of the housing supply within the area 
would be carried out to establish the area's housing threshold, i.e. the maximum 
housing demand the area could accommodate without stressing the existing 
supply. This capacity or threshold projection could be determined by local 
authorities. The proponent then could assess the project's housing requirements 
using this threshold value. Rather than needing to predict demand exactly, a 
more appropriate measure would be the order of magnitude of demand relative to 
existing supply. Housing demands below the threshold value would be considered 
acceptable while any demands exceeding it would indicate the potential for 
negative consequences such as an increase in rental rates and/or land and house 
prices. Demands exceeding the threshold would, therefore, signify the need to 
develop mitigative strategies and monitoring programs involving input from the 
proponent and local and provincial authorities. 
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Such a capacity approach would also address one criticism of the socto-
economtc impact assessment (SIA) conducted in relation to the Hibernia project, 
that being the inefficiency of the process. The Hibernia SIA process, in striving to 
be fully comprehensive, devoted equal consideration to all socio-economic issues. 
As a result, considerable attention was given to potential impacts which were both 
inconsequential and easily predictable prior to the assessment process (Shrimpton 
and Storey, 1992:106). Knowledge of the threshold for the various socio-economic 
components would serve to identify those impacts which were not problematic and 
those requiring more in-depth examination. This would help focus the assessment 
on the more important issues and thereby result in a more efficient use of the 
assessment resources available. 
This same capacity approach also could be used for the maximization of 
beneficial project impacts. For example, one of the prtmary issues associated with 
any development project is local employment opportunities. Knowledge of the 
local labour supply in the various occupations associated with the project could 
serve to highlight any shortages and, therefore, the type and scale of training 
programs required to enhance employment prospects for local residents. 
The shift. then, from a demand to a capacity perspective would result in 
the emphasis of the EIA moving from impact prediction to impact management. 
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The objective is to minimize adverse impacts. Consequently, greater attention 
would be placed more upon the development of strategies to manage project 
outcomes rather than the development of techniques to precisely predict these 
outcomes. The problem with predicting impacts is the many factors exogenous to 
the project, changes to which may make the predictions wrong. As a result, there 
is a need to develop strategies which are flexible in order to accommodate such 
changes in the overall environment in which the project operates as well as the 
project itself to allow for quick reassessment and modification of predictions 
made. 
Under this revised approach to EIA, the format and the role of the EIS 
would change. Instead of being viewed as a definitive document containing a list 
of precisely defined predictions, it would be treated as an initial inventory of 
possible project consequences at that particular point in time. It would outline 
the thresholds of the various environmental components under consideration, a 
predicted range of project impacts on these components, as well as an assessment 
of these predictions relative to the thresholds. The EIS, then, would not be seen 
as a final product of the EIA process, but rather as an ongoing working document 
to be referred to. reviewed and revised through the entire life of the project. As a 
result. the emphasis of EIA and the resultant EIS would change from impact 
prediction to impact management which would retain the decision-making 
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assistance function of EIA but which is more attuned to the post-decision 
requirements of managing potential environmental impacts associated with human 
activities in an environment of uncertainty. More importantly, the adoption of a 
dynamic EIS would help establish an ongomg feedback link between assessment 
results and management decisions thereby integrating EIA into the broader 
environmental planning process. 
6.5 The Environmental Planning Process 
Over the past twenty-five years an enhanced public environmental awareness and 
demands for greater accountability for the environmental consequences resulting 
from development projects, have led to the formation of a more rigorous and 
formalized environmental planning process. From an initial requirement to 
simply determine and assess a project's potential impacts, the process has evolved 
and expanded to include management and evaluation components. Management 
involves the development and implementation of strategies designed to enhance, 
to avoid or to mitigate project outcomes. Evaluation is concerned with the 
monitoring of project outcomes and the review of them vis-a-vis the management 
strategies implemented. The environmental planning process is generalized and 
illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: The Environmental Planning Process 
EVALUATION 
• monitoring of issues, 
predictions, management strategies 
• review and revision of 
impact assessment and strategies 















The assessment activities serve to identify, predict and assess the 
significance of the potential environmental project consequences. Ideally, 
following project approval, the results of the assessment, i.e. any information 
compiled, conclusions drawn and the recommended responses to address the 
specific project effects, should be integrated into the subsequent impact 
management stage. The main objectives of this stage are to avoid or reduce any 
adverse project impacts and to enhance any potential benefits. 
The function of the evaluation component is to monitor and audit the 
identified issues of concern and the management schemes designed and 
implemented to address them. Evaluation is an essential element of the process 
in that it: 
ensures that the issues of concern are being addressed and the 
identification of any subsequent issues that may emerge; 
allows the evaluation and revision of impact predictions; 
provides information to allow an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
management strategies; and 
serves a feedback function in that mtormation generated allows 
modifications to the impact management process as the project proceeds 
and may also be used in the assessment and management of future 
projects. 
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6. 6 EIA and Environmental Planning 
The fundamental function of EIA is to serve as a planning tool. It is not intended 
to be an end in and of itself but rather a means to an end, which is to assist in 
decision-making associated with the project planning process. As Fromby (1990: 
193) notes, 
the ultimate purpose of EIA is not just to assess impacts; it is to 
improve the quality of decisions. 
As a result, assessment activities should be conducted as early as possible 
in the project planning process to allow the results to be used in the initial stages 
of project decision-making. However, because project decision-making and 
planning continue throughout the life of the project. assessment should also be an 
ongomg exerctse. When the project commences, management plans and 
optimization strategies should be in place. Ongoing monitoring would then 
provide current information with which to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
mitigation and allow the identification and assessment of any unforeseen impacts. 
This information would then be used by managers to make any necessary 
modifications to the impact management strategies (Spaling et.al., 1993:70). Thus, 
EIA must be a continuous process in order to correspond to the dynamic nature 
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of the project and the iterative nature of the environmental planning process, as 
depicted in Figure 6.1. 
While the potential value of EIA to decision-making and the need for a 
continuous assessment process are widely acknowledged, current EIA and 
planning practices show little evidence that these have been either adopted or 
addressed. Some would argue that rather than being used to assist decision-
making, EIA is becoming "decreasingly related to actual decisions" (Fromby, 
1990:93). Quite often, EIA is employed as an ex-post-facto exercise. Typically, 
major decisions with respect to project alternatives and planning are made prior 
to conducting the EIA. The EIA is then used largely to generate mitigative 
measures for the pre-selected project (Ortolano and Shepherd, 1995: 15) and the 
EIS is designed to support the decisions already made (Ensminger and McLean, 
1993 :48-49). 
This post-decision employment of EIA is an indication of what Ortolano 
and Shepherd (1995: 15) term "the integration problem", i.e. the failure to 
integrate EIA into the project planning process. Two primary causes of the 
integration problem are identified. The first involves the low priority or low 
degree of significance assigned to environmental considerations by project 
proponents. Quite often, environmental objectives "take a back seat" to other 
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considerations, such as the internal economrc rate of return (Ortolano and 
Shepherd, 1995: 15). The second cause is the cost of undertaking an EIA. The 
EIA undertaken for military low-level flying exercises in Labrador, for example, 
took nine years to complete, from 1986-1995, at a cost of several million dollars. 
Thus, proponents would rather wait until the project is well-defined and has a 
high probability of being approved before investing in an EIA (Nelson, 1993 and 
Hirji, 1990 as interpreted and cited in Ortolano and Shepherd, 1995: 15). 
Thus, rather than being seen as a component of environmental planning, 
EIA has been generally viewed and treated as a separate process to be 
undertaken solely for the purpose of receiving development approval (Bisset and 
Tomlinson. 1988: 126). In addition, the approach to EIA has not been of an active 
and continuous nature which recognizes the role of interaction and feedback 
within the process. Instead, a discrete approach to EIA has been assumed which 
has resulted in the process being carried out as a sequence of individual static 
tasks, beginning with the proponent's initial development application and ending 
with the decision regarding project approval (Spaling et.al., 1993). 
The reason for the discrete view and approach to EIA is related to the fact 
that much of the EIA research to date has focused upon the "front-end" of the 
process, i.e. scoping, screening and the identification, prediction and assessment of 
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impacts (McCallum, 1987:743) rather than the "back-end" or post-approval stage 
of the process. In the past decade, the scope of the research has broadened with 
the notion of follow-up now being addressed with research being undertaken to 
determine the effectiveness of the "front-end" initiatives in managing the 
environmental consequences of the particular project. However, doing things 111 
separate stages, where they are 'independent' of one another, fails to 'integrate' 
the pieces so that the 'back end'is considered when the 'front end' is being 
designed. 
6. 7 Monitoring and Auditing: Fundamentals for Follow-Up 
The two fundamental components of effective follow-up are monitoring 
and auditing. While these two processes are discussed separately here, they are 
very much related. Monitoring involves a series of periodic and systematic data 
measurements over an extended period of time in order to detect change and to 
determine the nature of this change. The auditing process collates the monitoring 
data and evaluates the project-related changes relative to the predicted outcomes 
and the mitigative measures implemented. Thus, the success of the audit depends 
largely on the quality of the monitoring data and process which, in turn, can be 
evaluated and, if necessary, improved using the results of the audit. 
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The greatest value of monitoring and auditing, then, lies in their provision 
of critical feedback concerning both project consequences and the effectiveness of 
the implemented management schemes. The resultant information can benefit 
the management and planning of both the specific project ongoing at the time as 
well as subsequent projects. 
The establishment of effective formalized monitoring and auditing 
procedures would also serve in transforming EIA from its current status as a 
discrete and static, "one-time-only", pre-approval process, into an adaptive, 
iterative process that continues for the life of the project. As well, the institution 
of formal follow-up procedures would help to overcome the fundamental flaw in 
the present environmental planning process, the "isolation" of the impact 
assessment phase. Ongoing monitoring activities from the pre-project to the post-
project phase and the regular auditing of monitoring results throughout the 
project would result in the integration of assessment with the other components of 
the environmental planning process thereby fulfilling the intended role of EIA as 
a decision-making and planning tool. 
The requirements for and benefits of EIA follow-up activities are not a 
recenr discovery. For example, the importance of monitoring has been expressed 
since the 1970s (Ortolano and Shepherd, 1995:20) and the former Canadian 
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federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) ended with 
provisions for follow-up procedures (see Figure 2.1 and section 2.2). Despite this, 
such activities have not been commonplace. For example, based on a review of 
the EIA systems in place for the Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand, the United 
States, the Commonwealth of Australia and the United Kingdom, Wood (1995) 
concludes that few systems require auditing activities while the requirements for 
monitoring are either non-existent, discretionary, or lack a formal mechanism to 
ensure compliance. However, the recent increase in follow-up-related research 
has highlighted the demand for formal auditing procedures, as illustrated by the 
concluding remarks of McCallum in his review of environmental follow-up to 
Canadian federal projects: 
EIA programs and legislation have slowly brought real changes in 
the way projects are planned. It is suggested. however, that this 
process is unproductive unless follow-up also takes place ... It is now 
time for governments to incorporate follow-up into the system 
( 1987:743). 
Such demands seem to have been heeded in that the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) provides for the development and 
implementation of formal follow-up programs (see section 2.3). 
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6.8 The CEAA: An Improved EIA 
The Act in many respects has advanced the practice of EIA in that it directly 
addresses some of the deficiencies of the former environmental assessment and 
revtew process. For example, provisions for an environmental mediator and the 
"self-assessment" approach is aimed at improving the efficiency of the EIA process 
and reducing the significant time delays often associated with undertaking EIA. 
As well, the provisions for intervenor funding may help to enhance both the level 
of participation and the role of interested parties in the process. Further, the 
explicit requirement to consider the cumulative effects of several individual 
projects will serve to broaden the scope of EIA from the typical single-project, 
local-scale perspective to a multi-project regionaL and perhaps national and 
international focus. 
From an auditing standpoint, the Act has emphasized the value of and the 
need for undertaking audit investigations through its specification for follow-up. 
While the former EARP did contain provisions for follow-up activities, there was 
no formal requirement that they be carried out. However, the development of 
follow-up programs is a formal requirement of the Act which defines a "follow-up 
program" as one designed for: 
a) verifying the accuracy of the environmental assessment of a 
project, and 
b) determining the effectiveness of any measures taken to mltlgate 
the adverse environmental effects of the project (Canada, 1992:4). 
The details of such programs as well as arrangements for their implementation 
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must be indicated before the project is allowed to proceed. This consideration of 
follow-up in the initial stages of the project could help overcome some of the 
procedural difficulties experienced to date in conducting audit studies. 
The Act (section 55) also requires that the details of the assessment 
process, including the characteristics of the follow-up programs implemented and 
the results of such programs. be recorded in a public registry (Canada, 1992). 
Such documented feedback could benefit the assessment and management of 
future projects. 
6.9 The Limitations of the CEAA 
While it can be argued that the CEAA may contribute to improving EIA, 
limitations within the Act have been identified. The first pertains to the scope of 
the Act which is primarily project-focused with no specific considerations being 
outlined for the assessment of federal policies and programs. As well, the 
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substantial discretionary authority of the responsible authority and the Minister of 
Environment in determining which projects warrant more intensive investigation 
and, therefore, are referred for mediation or a review panel, is seen as another 
drawback of the Act (Spaling, et.al., 1993:72). 
Another limitation involves the definition of follow-up program within the 
Act. The second part of the definition is limited to management strategies 
designed to avoid or lessen the negative impacts of the project while ignoring the 
effectiveness of strategies implemented to create or enhance the social and 
economic benefits of the project. These, it is argued, are equally important 
considerations in many projects: 
many mega-projects are undertaken with economic development 
objectives in mind. in which case measures designed to create or 
enhance economic and social benefits are as important as those 
designed to avoid or ameliorate adverse effects (Storey, 1995:331). 
The nature of the follow-up and the resultant feedback is yet another 
potential shortfall. While provisions within the Act which allow for follow-up and 
the maintenance of a public registry will establish a formal feedback mechanism 
that should benefit subsequent projects, there is no explicit reference to a 
feedback process for a specific project. As a result, the Act does not seem to 
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promote a dynamic, iterative assessment process, but rather seems to have 
adopted the discrete approach to EIA. It appears that the assessment process ts 
still treated as a one-time exercise confined to the pre-approval stage of the 
project. The Act emphasizes that a project cannot proceed until an 
environmental assessment has been "completed". Notice of this "completion" is 
served by the issuing of an official certificate to this regard by the responsible 
authority. Provisions for this certificate are outlined in section 39 of the Act: 
A certificate that states that an environmental assessment of a 
project has been completed, and that is signed by a responsible 
authority that exercises a power of performs a duty or function ... in 
relation to the project, is ... proofof the matter stated (Canada, 
1992:26). 
With respect to the role of EIA, it is still described as an essential planning 
and decision-making tool that should be applied as early as possible in project 
planning (CEAA, 1994:6). EIA is considered an effective means of integrating 
environmental elements into the decision-making and planning processes so as to 
promote sustainable development (Canada, 1992: l). However, in order to achieve 
this integration of environmental factors, the results of the assessment component 
must be incorporated into the subsequent management component in the planning 
process (see Figure 6.1). 
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A criticism of EIA under the former EARP was that quite often the 
conclusions and recommendations of the review panel, i.e. the results of the 
assessment phase, were not adopted or· implemented into management strategies. 
Such was the case, for example, with respect to the recommendations of the 
Hibernia Environmental Assessment Panel (see Locke, 1994). However, this has 
been addressed by the Act (section 38:2b) which requires that the government 
authority responsible for the project make public the extent to which panel, as 
well as mediator, recommendations have been adopted and further, requires 
justification for any recommendations not adopted (Canada, 1992:26). 
The above provisions notwithstanding, the apparent discrete approach to 
EIA under the Act is unsuited to the dynamic nature of both the project and the 
planning process. thereby preventing the full integration of EIA into the decision-
making and planning processes: 
the Act fails to fully integrate environmental assessment into the 
planning process. It reinforces procedures and establishes 
institutions for environmental assessment which are parallel to but 
distinct from those of planning ... the role of EIA in decision-making 
needs to shift from one of peripheral, consultative involvement to 
one of integrated, decisive involvement (Spaling et.al., 1993:72). 
Chapter VII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The notion of environmental impact assessment as a formal process began with 
the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act (1969). It was a response to 
increasing public concern regarding the consequences of human development 
activities on the natural and human environments. 
A similar environmental awareness occurred in Canada during the late 
1960s and early 1970s. The public pressed government for formal procedures to 
ensure that consideration be given to the environmental impacts of human 
activities. The federal government responded in 1973 with the Environmental 
Assessment and Review Process. This process was applied to all developments 
for which the federal government had responsibility and was in effect until 1992, 
at which time it was replaced by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. 
Since its inception, the practice of environmental impact assessment has 
spread world-wide, with formal procedures being adopted both at the national 
level of most developed countries and at lower jurisdictions within these countries. 
For example, all provinces within Canada have formal environmental impact 
assessment procedures in place. Thus, considerable resources have been 
expended on the implementation of such procedures over the past 25 years. 
However, until recently, very little had been done by way of follow-up to 
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determine whether these assessment procedures have been effective in minimizing 
the adverse impacts and/or maximizing the benefits of development activities. 
While the importance of follow-up to assessment activities had been 
discussed within the research literature two decades earlier, it was not until the 
mid-l980s that an increased research effort arose with regard to post-assessment 
audits. The primary objective of these audits was to determine the accuracy of 
the predictions made with respect to project impacts. While many of these audits 
had a single project focus, three were more extensive multi-project investigations, 
one involving the United Kingdom (Clark et.al., 1987); the United States 
(Culhane. 1987a); and Australia (Buckley, 1991). 
A common characteristic of these three multi-project audits, and in fact of 
the majority of EIA audits performed to date, is the emphasis upon bio-physical 
issues; socio-economic issues are significantly under-represented in the EIA 
auditing research literature. As a result, the purpose of this thesis was to 
investigate socio-economic impact auditing. The objectives of this research were 
three-fold. Drawing upon the methods discussed in the literature, a method of 
conducting a socio-economic impact assessment (SEIA) audit was established. 
The second objective was to operationalize the auditing method using the 
Hibernia project as a specific case study. Finally, a more general objective was to 
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examme the role of EIA auditing in the contemporary EIA process as well as the 
broader environmental planning process, on the basis of earlier findings and those 
from the Hibernia audit. 
The results of the Hibernia socio-economic audit reveal that, of the 193 
predictions identified in Volume IV of the Hibernia Environmental Impact 
Statement and the Environmental Protection Plan for the project platform 
construction site, 185 were unsuited for audit. Of the eight which were auditable, 
three were "accurate" and the remaining five cases were found to be significantly 
different from those predicted. These few results precluded any definitive 
conclusions with respect to predictive accuracy. The generally vague nature of the 
predictive statements; time- and project-related changes; and the inferior quality 
of the monitoring data resulted in the less-than-adequate comparison of predicted 
and actual project outcomes. 
These conclusions are consistent with those of other audit investigations: a 
large proportion of impact predictions proved to be untestable and project 
impacts were seldom accurately forecast. Such findings are not surprising given 
that typically, and Hibernia included, the assessment is usually conducted and 
predictions made at a time when there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding 
project design derails. As a result, and particularly when there is a delay between 
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assessment activities and project implementation, project design modifications and 
changes to the exogenous socio-economic factors result in a significantly different 
project being undertaken from that originally and, consequently, significant 
differences between actual and predicted project outcomes. 
The results of this research, then, as well as those of other audit studies, 
bring into question the current method of EIA auditing. The simple accounting 
framework, which calculates and examines the difference between predicted and 
actual outcomes, is an inadequate approach given the dynamic nature of projects 
and the socio-economic context in which they operate. Further, the results of the 
existing auditing approach are of limited value with respect to evaluating the 
success of the assessment process in the planning for and management of project 
outcomes. For example, a high percentage of "accurate" predictions may not 
necessarily indicate effective impact management but may simply show that the 
predictions were generally worded and thus unlikely to be found incorrect. 
Conversely, a low predictive accuracy may not indicate that significantly adverse 
consequences have resulted, as in cases in which actual outcomes were either less 
severe than anticipated or lessened by mitigative strategies. Thus, what IS more 
important at the end of the day is not the proportion of EIS predictions which 
proved accurate. but rather whether the results of the assessment process 
promoted effective decision-making and contributed to the avoidance of 
unexpected, the minimization of adverse and the enhancement of beneficial 
project consequences. The EIA auditing approach employed to date, however, 
does not concern itself with such considerations. 
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This suggests the need for a shift in the emphasis of auditing from one 
which focuses on the "precision II of impact predictions to one which deals with the 
II effectiveness" of EIA as an impact management tool. With respect to feedback, 
a more pragmatic function for auditing would involve determining whether the 
key issues were identified, what enhancement or mitigation measures were 
developed to address them, whether these measures were implemented and the 
effectiveness of those that were. Compared to the current audit approach, the 
results of such an exercise would seem more useful by way of feedback for the 
management of both current and future projects. 
The focus of the existing auditing approach is a reflection of the "demand 
perspective" of contemporary EIA with its heavy emphasis on predictive prec1s1on. 
Efforts are geared toward constructing the EIS as a definitive document 
containing a list of precise project outcomes. Using a "capacity" approach to EIA, 
the EIS, instead. would be used as a working document, an inventory of potentiaL 
project impacts. The description of these impacts would include a range of 
impacts rather than a single value, thereby reducing the need for predictive 
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prec1s1on. The EIS would also indicate the significance of these impact 
predictions relative to pre-determined threshold values of the various 
environmental components within the scope of the assessment. Predictions 
nearing or exceeding the thresholds would highlight the need for mitigative or 
enhancement management measures. As a result, the emphasis of EIA, and thus 
the focus of the EIS, would change from impact prediction to that of impact 
management. Accordingly, the focus of the audit would move from the accuracy 
of impact predictions made to the effectiveness of the impact management 
strategies employed. 
This is not to down play the importance of EIA. The assessment process 
remains essential to the initial decision-making process when determining whether 
the project should or should not proceed. Once the decision is made to continue, 
the focus then shifts from the identification and assessment of the likely impacts 
of the project to the management of those impacts. Assessment is still an 
important component of the project management phase. However, its purpose 
changes from simply evaluating the project's environmental acceptability to also 
evaluating the project's environmental management strategies. Thus, similar to 
the term "environmental audit", the notion of EIA has evolved and now 
encompasses a much broader scope than was originally intended, including both 
pre- and post-approval activities. Hence, the term "environmental impact 
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assessment" is too limited to adequately describe the post-decision role of EIA 
and should be expanded to "environmental impact assessment and management". 
Over the past decade, this evolution of EIA has resulted in a shift in 
emphasis from front-end, pre-approval processes to back-end or post-approval 
activities. Much attention has been given to monitoring and auditing, with the 
importance and benefit of such follow-up procedures being widely recognized. 
However, research literature indicates that for most recent projects monitoring 
and auditing programs were either never put in place or the objectives of such 
programs not clearly defined. In cases where monitoring was undertaken, the 
quality of the data often prevented any thorough audit analysis of them. As a 
result. from an impact management perspective, the critical feedback function of 
monitoring and auditing could not be fully realized. 
The inadequacy of the monitoring being undertaken is related to the fact 
that. despite the extensive research conducted in the past decade demonstrating 
the importance and value of monitoring, the monitoring of project impacts is not 
a formal requirement under the EIA procedures of many countries. For example, 
a comparative review of seven EIA systems of several countries indicates, four did 
not contain specific requirements for monitoring, while the remaining three 
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contained only partial requirements. In many cases, discretionary provisions exist, 
but in practice, these are rarely employed. 
Canada's EIA procedure under the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Act is viewed positively relative to procedures of other countries. The formal 
definition of "follow-up program" under the Act and its requirement for the 
development and approval of the follow-up program prior to project approval 
were seen as strong points of the Canadian system. 
This notwithstanding, there still exist some limitations of the CEAA with 
respect to the notion of follow-up. For example, the CEAA definition of follow-
up program within the Act addresses only the effectiveness of any mitigative 
measures and does not specifically include the effectiveness of enhancement 
strategies implemented during the project. 
Another potential shortfall of the follow-up section of the CEAA involves 
the function of the feedback to be generated. While the provisions of the Act 
seem to ensure feedback to benefit subsequent projects, there is no explicit 
feedback procedure for the project at hand. Such a feedback mechanism is 
necessary to establish EIA as a continuous, iterative process to span the life of the 
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project and in so doing to help overcome the 'integration problem' and fully link 
EIA with the other components of the planning process. 
The CEAA was officially passed in 1992. As of November 1995, only four 
of the regulations designed to administer its provisions had been finalized, with 
the regulations/guidelines governing follow-up issues among others still in the 
development stages. Hopefully, the final regulations applicable to follow-up will 
address the above deficiencies and ultimately establish monitoring and auditing 
procedures as a normal and effective part of project planning and management. 
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